The influence of Soviet and American political culture on negotiating positions: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Case by Blackburn, William Rockwell
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1984-03
The influence of Soviet and American political
culture on negotiating positions: the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Case
Blackburn, William Rockwell
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/19380











THE INFLUENCE OP SOVIET AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
CULTURE ON NEGOTIATING POSITIONS:




The sis Advisor: R. Bathurst




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Wh»n Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
I. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
The Influence of Soviet and American
Political Culture on Negotiating Positions
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Case
5. TYPE OF REPORT 4 PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis
; March 19 84
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORO)
William Rockwell Blackburn
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERCM
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
132




16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of thia Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol tha abatracl entered In Block 30, It dlftarant from Report)
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WOROS (Contlnua on ravataa alda If naeaaaavy and Identity by block number)
Soviet Union, United States, Political Culture, INF Negotiations,
National Characteristics, Ideology, Soviet Political Culture,










on ravaraa altta It naeaaaavy and Identity by block number)
s explores the influence of the underlying political
e Soviet Union and the United States on the positions
rnments at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force
It defines the term political culture as the
amework within which politics operates. The thesis
s the historical evolution and primary character-
elite political cultures of both nations. In the
is a cultural model, or stereotype of the political
DO FORM1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV SS IS OBSOLETE
S-'N 0102- IF- 014-6601
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Kntar-

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Ent*rmd)
elite of each nation is postulated. This model is then utilized
to evaluate the negotiating positions of each country from a
cultural standpoint. Finally, the thesis concludes that
political culture probably does influence the positions of
governments and may be a useful method of evaluating those
positions and predicting future actions. In addition, the thesis
sees a possibility of utilizing political culture as one method
of determining the importance of those positions to the governments
involved.
S'N 0102- LF- 014- 6601
UNCLASSIFIED
2 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS P KGE(Whan Data EnHrati)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
The Influence of Soviet and American Political Culture on




Commander, United States Navy
B.A., Northwestern University, 1968
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







This thesis explores the influence of the underlying
political culture of the Soviet Union and the United States
on the positions of those governments at the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Force Negotiations. It defines the term
political culture as the conceptual framework within which
politics operates. The thesis then discusses the historical
evolution and primary characteristics of the elite political
cultures of both nations. In the process of this a cultural
model, or stereotype of the political elite of each nation
is postulated. This model is then utilized to evaluate the
negotiating positions of each country from a cultural stand-
point. Finally, the thesis concludes that political culture
probably does influence the positions of governments and may
be a useful method of evaluating those positions and pre-
dicting future actions. In addition, the thesis sees a
possibility of utilizing political culture as one method of
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and the Soviet Union are adversaries.
This adversarial relationship is the result of myriad causes
which can be said to range over a continuum which includes
basic political culture, national personality, ideology,
national interests, superpower competitive interests, and
competitive tactical advantage as some of its major points.
Each level of this continuum might be seen as building upon
and being related to the more general level beneath it. At
the broadest and most nonspecific level are the basic
cultural differences between the two nations, differences
which can influence political behavior.
It is the thesis of this study that the political cultures
of the Soviet Union and the United States may be differentiated
from each other and that some of these differences between the
two cultures may be generally specified. Having been specified,
these cultural differences may be utilized as one dimension
of understanding the relationship between the two countries.
The method utilized to investigate this thesis will be to
define several characteristics of each political culture and
then use those characteristics to construct a model repre-
sentative of each nation, a national political stereotype, as
it were. Once defined, the model can then be used to inter-
pret and predict the behavior of the political leadership.

To check its validity the model will be used to evaluate and
predict the reactions of each side to the positions and
statements of the other at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Force (INF) Negotiations currently ongoing in Geneva,
Switzerland.
This is not a precise subject. What Edward T. Hall calls
the "covert culture" [Ref. 1] is one that is experienced on
the subconscious, emotional level rather than on what we might
consider the rational level. Thus, when cultures interrelate
these unconscious forces are at work to a degree that is
extremely difficult to understand, much less verbalize.
Hall states:
It is dif ficult. . . . for mankind to come to grips with the
fact that there are deep cultural differences that must
be recognized, made explicit and dealt with before one
can arrive at the underlying human nature we all share....
if man is not to destroy himself he must begin to
transcend his own culture. First, the overt, obvious
culture-which it is possible to bridge with patience and
good will-but the second and more important, unconscious
culture-which it is more difficult to transcend. [Ref. 2]
Because of the force of the unconscious level the effects
of culture on political views are insidious and often obscure.
As just one example, the massive influx of both legal and
illegal immigrants to the United States, in contrast to the
strict control of people both into and out of the Soviet Union,
goes beyond mere policy and exemplifies a basic cultural
difference between the two societies.
While open American borders reflect the operation of the
"melting-pot" myth, at times in direct conflict with what
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might be considered the best interests of the country , the
massive Soviet effort to make its borders seemingly
impenetrable shows a culture extremely concerned with its
security and survival. One would expect a similar border
violation to cause vastly different reactions in each society
because of these basic cultural differences.
As might be expected these cultural differences are
difficult to pin down. At the very least statements cited
as proof of cultural impact in this thesis may be termed
ambiguous. A so-called "realist" looking at a position or
statement might see a clear-cut case of national or superpower
competitive interest in the same situation this thesis will
claim as an example of cultural nuance.
This leads to the importance of emphasizing the amorphous
and ubiquitous nature of the cultural influence on the politi-
cal relations between the two nations. Political culture can
be thought of as shading each nation's views of events, ideas,
even facts. It can also be seen as manifesting itself in both
the actions and the rhetoric of each side.
For example, American rhetoric is often moralistic in
tone, extolling the "goodness" or "rightness" of the American
position. Soviet rhetoric relies heavily on references to
Marxist-Leninist teachings, to the "correctness" of their
scientific position. Each side seems convinced of the
applicability of their rhetorical references, and well they
might be 'because of the unconscious influences of the different
political cultures.

It is also important to qualify any single explanation of
the behavior of nations with the self-evident but oft for-
gotten concept of complexity. It is essential to understand
"....every nation is a complex, with variations in behavior
and personality...." [Ref. 3] and is populated by real people
who "....are blends, more complicated and various-things of
shreds and patches-than any scheme can encompass." [Ref. 4]
Another important qualification is the fact that, "....back-
ground factors never directly cause behavior; they cause
attitudes [and other mental sets] and the latter in turn
determine behavior." [Ref. 5]
It is the integration of all the factors in the continuum
mentioned above which is helpful in explaining the political
behavior of nations. Not only must many factors be considered,
but each factor may vary in importance depending upon the
relative situation.
A. POLITICAL CULTURE DEFINED
As defined in this study political culture is the framework
for ideas within which conceptual politics operates. Stephen
White defines political culture as the " . . . . attitudinal and
behavioral matrix within which the political system is
located." [Ref. 6]
Sidney Verba further defines it by stating that "....It
refers to the system of beliefs about patterns of political




what is happening in the world of politics, but what people
believe about those happenings...." [Ref. 7] More specifically,
political culture may be called "....that set of attitudes,
practices and sentiments that gives order and meaning to the
political process in the minds of the members of the ....
community." [Ref. 8]
Political culture appears to be evolutionary, a combination
of national characteristics, psychology, and historical
political experience. As such it is relatively stable, modi-
fying in response to changes in historical conditions rather
than changing outright. As Alfred Meyer says "Culture is that
which lags." [Ref. 9] As an example, the Russian political
culture, as Edward Keenan argues, appears to have shown a
remarkable tenacity throughout its history, despite significant
changes in the political and social conditions in the nation.
[Ref. 10]
Participants in the political culture, particularly the
members of the political elite, are socialized into the culture
in such a way that the cultural beliefs become a person's
fundamental beliefs, so basic that they remain as unstated
assumptions about life that "....each individual holds.... and
believes that all other individuals hold." [Ref. 11]
The political culture of each nation studies in this
thesis has evolved throughout its historical experience, as
the nation has reacted to its environment, the background of
its inhabitants, and the specific historical problems
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confronting it. In order to understand the make-up of each
political culture its historical framework must be discussed,
its evolution studied. It is not the purpose here to recite
a lengthy history of the U.S. and the USSR but rather to
sketch the unique historical framework within which the
political cultures have evolved.
B. FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE
The dominant factors in the Russian framework appear to
have been space and vulnerability which combined to form a
culture apparently dominated by a concern for survival.
The original Russian state, the Kievian, was located on
the eastern edges of populated Europe, well to the west of
the Ural Mountains which provided its only, if meager, natural
protection from invaders from the east. And invasions there
were, beginning in the fourth century with the Huns and
continuing through many subsequent invasions including those
by the Bulgars, Avars, Khazars, Magyars, and Pechenegs. This
vulnerability to, and history of, invasion had an important
impact on the development of survival as a characteristic
trait of the Russian political culture.
It was during the Pecheneg invasion in the ninth century
that the Slavic state of Kiev was set up with the help of
Viking protectors. The Kievian state struggled through over
three centuries of difficult existence only to be destroyed
by Genghis Khan and his "Golden Horde" of Mongols. The Tartar
12

empire collapsed in the fifteenth century and a new Russian
state, under Ivan the Great emerged. This state was also
destined for a dreadful existence, exemplified by an invasion
in 1571 by Crimean Tartars, in which 800,000 Russians were
killed and over 130,000 taken prisoner. [Ref. 12]
Beginning in the seventeenth century the threats to the
Russian state came mostly from the west, where no natural
impediments to invasion existed. For seven years from 1606
the Poles occupied Russia. With the defeat of the Poles in
1613 the Romanov dynasty was established.
One result of the rise of the Romanovs was the concurrent
rise of the characteristically Russian tendency to overcome
their lack of geographical protection by expanding and
acquiring buffer states. The historical expansion was in all
directions, east across Siberia, south to the Black Sea and
west to the Baltic. The extent of the expansion was phenomenal.
One author captures its essence in this manner: "In the
century and a half between 1550 and 1700 Moscow was annually
adding to her territory an area equal to that of modern Holland.
"
[Ref. 13/emphasis in original]
While the extent of the expansion is a matter of historical
record, the motivation for it is less clear. Was it the
result of some innate Russian need to conquer? Or was it just
the reaction of a defensive minded people, attempting to
assure the survival of their beleaguered state? As George




From the very beginnings of Muscovite supremacy, the
main direction of expansion was determined by the need
to protect the geostrategic, economic and racially vital
core against threats from south, north, and west—to wit,
to the steppes from marauding Tartars, to approaches to
the sea from militaristic Swedes, and to the seat of
national faith and power from Catholic Poles. Generally,
the impulse behind the either sequential or near-
simultaneous thrusts northward (toward the Baltic Sea)
and southward (toward the Caspian and Black Seas) was
on balance defensive, while the drive eastward (toward
the Pacific Ocean) was more acquisitive. But whether
the Russians expanded in response to threat or to
temptation, the core never ceased to feel vulnerable to
hostile invasion or isolation. [Ref. 14]
If the expansion was defensive, designed to guarantee the
survival of the Russian state it appears to have been
successful, for the state (although in a different form) has
survived the Napoleanic invasion of 1812, a disastrous defeat
in World War I, and the German invasion of World War II. The
survival of the Russian state was not without serious cost,
upwards of a quarter of a million casualties in 1812 [Ref. 15],
-*f
about 5.5 million casualties in World War I [Ref. 16], and
the officially proclaimed twenty million dead in World War II.
While it is obvious that the revolution put an end to a monarchy
which had endured throughout Russian history, the state as an
entity, despite its apparent radical change in character,
survived.
This brief sketch was designed to show the geographical
and historical environment in which the Russian political
culture evolved. As will be discussed below the culture
places a premium on survival. It is easy to see from the
framework presented above that, "From the beginning in the
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ninth century, and even today, the prime driving force in
Russia has been fear." [Ref. 17] It follows, as Louis Halle
has said, that:
Russia's experience. .. .was not such as makes for an open,
friendly and guileless society. It was not such as makes
for a liberal and pacificistic society. On the contrary,
all the circumstances of Russian history have, from the
beginning, imposed the necessity of complete discipline
under autocratic authority- this is the price of survival.
[Ref. 18]
C. FRAMEWORK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE
The dominant factors in the American framework appear to
have been isolation and success. Early Americans found them-
selves with a vast continent that was virtually uninhabited
(estimated indigenous population of about one and one half
million [Ref. 19]). While the Russians struggled for survival
in an unfriendly climate, constantly threatened by hostile
invasions, Americans had to concern themselves basically with
the struggle to dominate their environment. While this was
certainly a formidable task, they were at least spared the
constant fear of annililation by enemies which dominated
Russian history.
Americans came to the continent seeking to strike out in
new directions, to turn their backs on the old European
problems. As early as 1678 the residents of Massachusetts
were proclaiming that "....the lawes of England are bounded
within the fower seas, and doe not reach America." [Ref. 20]
Once independent the United States sought to continue this
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isolation from European problems which could threaten the
peace, prosperity and ideals of the new nation. This is given
ample proof in Washington's farewell address:
Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part
of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the
toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor
or caprice? [Ref. 21]
With this pervasive attitude of isolation, and given the
protection from invasion by two vast oceans and the de facto
political protection of the British Navy for much of its early
history, the American situation provided a unique environment
for the nurturing of democratic institutions. Isolated by
geography and inclination from the European problems they had
sought to escape, the American experience appears to have been
one of continuous success. Using the luxury of isolation
Americans could devote much of their effort to the mastering
of their environment. The conquering of the west and the
carving out of a common civilization on the American continent
in a relatively short time serve as examples to Americans of
their uniqueness and ability to solve problems.
The success achieved in this endeavor set the tone for
the American view of problem solution, one facet of its
political culture. The ease of victory in the Spanish-American
War, the success of the intervention in World War I, and the
victory in World War II have continued to solidify the frame-
work for the evolution of the American political culture, a
culture which seems quite different from the Soviet.
16

D. BASIC SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE
The Soviet political culture will be discussed in chapter
III of this thesis. A brief, generalized version which
includes the major points under discussion appears here.
These traits are presented not as strictly accurate indicators
of political behavior but as nuances of that behavior which
might be seen as characteristic and different from those which
may be termed characteristically American.
It is the view of this thesis that the Soviet political
culture can be described as one whose citizens view life as
a struggle for survival which can only be successfully
accomplished through group effort. This group process has
evolved a method of operating in an informal manner, making
decisions in secret and fostering a situation where each
person distrusts all others as possible threats to group
survival, thereby causing decisions to be made in a collegial
or corporate manner. This group oriented, ad-hoc, consensus
building method of making decisions seems to be as prevalent
today in the operation of the Politburo as it was with the
operation of the peasant councils in the ancient Russian
village. [Ref. 22]
In this culture the authority of the group approaches
the absolute, requiring virtually complete submission by its
individual members. Since individual responsibility for
failure can have serious consequences, it is essential that
individuals not stand out, that responsibility for group action
17

rest with the collective. The well-known proclivity of the
Soviet military to operate "by the book", and the seeming
stifling of individual initiative are modern examples of this
cultural trait.
The strong drive for survival leads the group to shun
outsiders as threats. This fear of outsiders reaches
virtually paranoic proportions, insinuating itself into many
political situations. It manifests itself in a tight secrecy
surrounding group processes, strict control over public dis-
agreements among the group, and the facade of a united front
to the outside. The lack of a large body of knowledge about
the operation of the decision making process in the Soviet
government serves as apparent proof that it does, in fact,
operate in this closed manner.
Another manifestation of this paranoia is the use of
deception and sometimes outright lying when dealing with non-
members. The Soviet appears to fear chaos, and so must control
his environment. Control, by definition, must approach the
absolute, which means that possible threats to security cannot
be tolerated for long. The Russians often deal with these
threats in a "no-holds-barred" manner, unfettered by strict
interpretations of legality, using means that employ secrecy
and deception often applied in an autocratic and arbitrary
way.
Thus the historical framework and its cultural manifestations
appear to dovetail. Vulnerability probably leads to concerns
18

about survival which surely contributes to paranoia about
enemies. Obviously there is greater safety in space and
therefore expansion becomes one method of survival.
E. BASIC AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE
The generalized version of the American political culture
presented in the succeeding paragraphs appears different from
that of the Soviet. Again, these characteristics are presented
here not as strict indicators of individual behavior but as
examples of the nuances of political behavior that might show
cultural influence.
Americans can be described as moralistic and idealistic,
but less ideological than the Soviets. They pride themselves
on being rational and pragmatic, which appears to lead to a
legalistic method of operation. For example, the strong
American support of international organizations shows a
committment to the underlying legalism upon which these
organizations are based.
Americans tend to be ethnocentristic, believing in the uni-
versality of their solutions to world problems, an apparent
outgrowth of their history of success. The Marshall Plan,
the IMF, and any number of other U.S. attempts to shape the
post war world with American economic principles provide good
examples of this American universalism.
This belief in the universality of American solutions to
the world's problems leads to identifying oversimplification
as another American cultural trait. This universalism allows
19

Americans to oversimplify extremely complex problems so that
their solutions fit. The "Domino Theory" is a good example
here. That the loss of one nation to a communist insurgency
would lead inexorably to the loss of other nations in a region
appears a gross oversimplification which ignores the immense
complexities of the actual situation. The apparent U.S.
solution to the problem posed by the "Domino Theory" , to stop
the domino in Vietnam, may be seen as an example of a simplistic
view of what was really a complex situation.
In contrast to the Soviets, Americans seem to live in the
present, having little specific, coordinated direction to their
view of the future and no particularly strong ties to the past.
This could explain the American prediliction for short term
solutions to problems. The New Deal could be seen as an
example of both of these points. It could be characterized
as a radical change from past practices to solve an immediate
crisis with little thought given to the future effects of the
changes. While summing the New Deal up in one sentence is a
serious oversimplification itself, the example serves to show
the importance of the present to the American, as opposed to
the past and future.
This emphasis on the present may also be partly responsible
for the American desire to maintain the status quo. The
support of Latin American dictators can be seen as an example
of this trait. It appears that American leaders have been
more concerned with the maintenance of known quantities in
20

their relations in Latin American than to the perpetuation of
the Democratic ideals they so eloquently espouse. This
indicates that Americans seem to see, in the present, a world,
while not perfect, that is capable of being operated in so
not in need of massive changing.
F. IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL CULTURE
It is an argument of this study that the Soviet political
culture is strongly ideologically centered, while the American
is less so. The term ideology is defined here as the
existence of a single set of ideas and symbols which gives
the citizen a systematic view of the world and is
institutionalized in the state machinery.
This is a good description of the role of Marxist-Leninist
ideology in the Soviet state. On the other hand, the American
ideology is less strictly defined, not institutionalized, and
allows citizens to hold multifarious views of their nation's
place in history. It is the existence of these differences
which leads us to emphasize the importance of ideology in the
Soviet culture and deemphasize it in the American.
Additionally, it appears that Soviet political culture
seems to both shape and be shaped by its ideology. It is
the Leninism part of Marxism-Leninism which allows the Soviet
state to claim to be Marxist while deemphasizing two fundamental
tenets of Marx's philosophy, democratic socialism and the
withering away of the state. The previously cited enormous
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sacrifices of the Russian people throughout their history, in
part to ensure the survival of the state as an entity, could
hardly be thought of as an environment which would allow the
state to "wither away". Thus the culture, in this case has
shaped the ideology.
On the other hand, the group oriented nature of Marxism
seems to complement the historical Russian political culture,
and is a piece of the ideology which could be expected to be
adopted with fervor by the Russians. In this case the
ideology fits the existing culture. It appears, then, that
the Soviet state might be seen as being strongly ideological
because the ideology and the culture are mutually supportive,
and tend to reinforce each other.
G. THE USE OF THE CULTURAL MODEL AND THE INF NEGOTIATIONS
One test of whether there is a cultural basis for the
political behavior of each nation is in the study of specific
interactions. The interactions selected for study in this
thesis are those associated with the INF negotiations between
the U.S. and the USSR.
These negotiations bring no special qualifications to
their role as examples of cultural influence upon political
behavior. Any number of other Soviet-American interactions
could have been chosen and, if the theory of cultural influence
has merit, could serve equally well as examples for study.
Choosing . INF, however, does lend some convenience to this
22

thesis because the negotiations are finite and topical, and
the positions stated in relatively specific terms. A synopsis
of the INF positions to date follows below.
By way of introduction, the situation which led to the
negotiations began because of a NATO decision in the late
19 70 's to correct the apparent growing imbalance of inter-
mediate range nuclear missiles in Europe by modernizing its
arsenal with the deployment of new U.S. Pershing II and Ground
Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) . At the same time negotiations
with the Soviets were to occur which would attempt to control
the level of weapons in Europe, and thus the threat of war.
In response to the NATO action the Soviets, in February
1981, proposed a freeze on their modern, capable SS-20 missiles
if the Pershing II' s and GLCM's were not deployed.
Just prior to the commencement of the negotiations in
November of 19 81 President Reagan proposed the "zero-option"
plan, which would have cancelled the deployment of the U.S.
missiles in return for the dismantling of all intermediate
range Soviet missiles in Europe.
In December 19 82 the Soviet Union proposed a cutback in
its missiles to the equivalent of the British and French missiles
already in place. Additionally, in May 19 83 the Soviets pro-
posed to reduce their missiles so that there would be an
equivalency in numbers of warheads available to each side.
Finally, President Reagan countered with an interim
relaxation of the "zero option" plan which would reduce the
23

number of Pershing II 's and GLCM's deployed to an equal but
unspecified number of Soviet missiles.
In Chapter IV this thesis analyzes these positions, the
statements associated with them, and the reactions to them
by each side; to determine if cultural factors might be present
both in the substance of the positions and in the rhetoric
surrounding them. It suggests that there are cultural factors
at work here, factors which must be taken into account in any
analysis of the opposing positions.
However, before this cultural analysis can be attempted
a detailed discussion of the cultural points to be analyzed
must occur. This will be accomplished for the Soviet political
culture in chapter II and the American culture in Chapter III.
24

II. SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE
Modern Soviet political culture has direct roots in the
Great Russian political culture. Edward L. Keenan argues
this thesis convincingly when he states that:
..., Great Russian political culture. .. .has displayed
remarkable tenacity and continuity over the last few
centuries and that after an episode of aberrant and
discontinuous development that embraced several decades
beginning around the turn of the present century, the
traditional vernacular political culture was, in a
number of its essential features, reestablished. [Ref. 23]
The basic cultural assumptions which will be discussed
in this thesis are:
1. Environmental conditions dictated that survival be
a guiding principle of political action;
2. Individual survival was difficult, if not impossible,
under these conditions impelling the individual to
abandon his individuality to the group;
3. Man was considered as basically evil. If left on
his own he would act in a manner which might threaten
the survival of the group;
4. Since man was evil he must be strictly controlled.
Rule tended to be autocratic and patrimonial;
5. Since the individual's political existence was tied
to the group, group decisions about virtually all
facets of life were necessary;
6. Once group decisions, arrived at by consensus, became
operative little deviation was allowed;
7. If the group was successful at surviving it tended to
take on a conservative outlook, avoiding risks which
could detract from that survival;
8. The conservative group closed ranks and became extremely
suspicious of outsiders; seeing them as threats to
survival. This suspicion could take the form of showing




The Soviet elite political culture is strongly ideological
in nature. It is often said that the Marxist ideology has
been abandoned by the Soviets, and that the country acts on
the basis of superpower interest alone. The thrust of this
argument is that because current Soviet ideology is in-
consistent with the original concept of Marxism (reasons most
often cited are the Soviet rejection of democratic socialism
and the overpowering presence of the state) , and that even
accepting Lenin's modifications of Marxism at face value,
there is insufficient evidence to indicate that ideology
permeates the political behavior of the nation. What these
arguments seem to disregard is the irresistable appeal of
some Marxist ideas and behavior to the inheritors of the
Russian political culture.
Adam Ulam states that, "Lenin instinctively groped for
the uses of Marxism under Russian conditions and found in it
the road to revolution." [Ref. 24/emphasis in original] The
ability of Soviet leaders to adapt the Marxist ideology to
the Russian experience in a complementary fashion has been
an important ingredient in their success. Of the many groups
seeking to gain power after the demise of the Tsar the
Bolsheviks seem to have been the ones which most closely
resembled the traditional Russian political culture in nature.
That they prevailed in the end can be seen as an indication
of the continuity of that culture.
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It is this blending of the tenacious Great Russian
political culture with the Marxist-Leninist ideology which
forms the basis for modern Soviet political behavior. Each
of these important elements will be treated in detail.
A. RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE
In the introductory remarks of this thesis the historical
framework of the Russian political culture was discussed.
This section will build on that framework by tracing the
development of the traditional Russian political culture,
both peasant and elite, in response to the physical and
political environment of early Russia.
The modern Russian state had its beginnings in the vast
forest land which occupies much of the northern Eurasian land
mass. The soil in this largest forest in the world is poor,
containing little natural plant food and requiring deep
ploughing in order to sustain growth. The climate in this
area is hot in the short summers and extremely cold throughout
the long winters.
Rain falls in an uneven pattern, being most plentiful in
the northwest where the soil is poorest. Rainfall is the
heaviest in the late summer, when nearly one quarter of the
annual accumulation occurs. [Ref. 25] Thus only a slight
deviation from the normal pattern could lead to drought
conditions in the spring and heavy downpours at harvest. This
combination of poor soil, long cold winters, and suboptimum
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rainfall patterns leads to an extremely short and often
unproductive growing season.
One consequence of these poor environmental factors is
poor yields. Poor yields have an enormous impact on the
industrial, commercial and political growth of a nation. As
Richard Pipes states:
It may be said that civilization begins only where one
grain of seed multiplies itself at least five times; it
is this minimum surplus which determines ... .whether a
significant proportion of the population can be released
from the necessity of raising food to pursue other
occupations. [Ref. 26]
It wasn't until the late nineteenth century that Russian
yields exceeded even 1:3, considered the minimum required to
sustain life. [Ref. 27] Russian life was indeed a struggle
to survive.
The poor land, harsh climate and vast expanses led to the
development of a populace whose primary goal was necessarily
to survive. This goal could more easily be reached by the
development of certain behaviors "....caution, calculation,
resoluteness, stoicism, [and] endurance." [Ref. 28] We still
find these traits in the modern Russian political culture.
It also became clear that given the harsh climate and
frequent invasions, survival in Russia could be best
accomplished by combining all individuals into groups which
would then be able to survive. The smallest political unit
in Russia was not the individual but the village, to which
all individuals were subordinated. And the village organization
was directed to one end, survival. Keenan summarizes:
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Thus the overpowering objective of the peasant village
organization— an objective developed over centuries of
unchanging subsistence agriculture, an objective whose
imperatives created a tight nucleus bound by immense
forces of both cohesion and fission—was survival,
economic, biological, and social survival. Not justice....
not material improvement or the accumulation of wealth,
not the "preservation of way of life", but the preservation
of life itself, human life, the life of vital stock, and
the life-giving field cultures. [Ref. 29]
The village's measure of success in assuring the survival of
its members was just that, survival. Once survival was
assured the methods by which that was achieved would become
difficult to change. Thus a primary goal of decision-making
in that environment was the minimization of risk, the avoidance
of a calamity which would endanger survival.
Unacceptable risks were those which might upset the
precarious balance that ensured survival, even if that change
could improve the quality of life in the village. Similarly,
if the interests of the individual in any way could be seen
as a threat to group survival, group interests tended to
prevail. An example would be that if a family were to show
signs of a prosperity above the level thought appropriate by
the village, they would be forced to sacrifice for the common
good. On the other hand, were a family to fall on hard times
to the extent that it could no longer be a productive member
of the community, it would be given the assistance necessary
to ensure that it could do its share for the village. Thus,
both upward and downward sanctions were imposed by the village
to ensure group survival.
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The viability of the group took on great importance in
this society, often overshadowing the rights of the individual.
An important aspect of the subjugation of the individual to
the group is the pessimistic view of man held by the Russians.
Edward Keenan describes this view as follows:
....the Great Russian peasant had a "low" opinion of Man,
was "fearful" of Man's potential to be weak, destructive,
and dangerous to the (vital) interests of the group, and,
consequently, treated others, and himself in an authoritarian
manner. [Ref. 30]
Since man was seen as not capable of internal control, he must
be controlled by the group, if he is not to endanger its
survival.
This view of man seems to be as true in the modern
political culture as it was in ancient Russia. Evidence of
this is shown in statements by Lenin who accuses the Russian
of "instability and slovenliness", and Stalin who castigates
them for their "backwardness". [Ref. 31] One manifestation of
this view of man is the Russian obsession with control, in
order for man not to destroy the group all aspects of his
behavior must be controlled.
One example of control in governmental terms was the rise
of authoritarianism. It is important to place this fact in
perspective again. The vast expanse of Russia, the constant
fear of invasion, the widely separated, conservative and
autonomous villages all militated against any centralization
of power. But centralization was essential to survival and
could be. best accomplished through strict authoritarianism:
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To survive in this hostile environment, the Russians had
to organize their lives along quasi-military lines, united
and disciplined. The whole society had to be prepared for
continuous military defense. To command the men and
resources necessary to protect the state, its government
had to be in complete control. Thus, while others have
faced foreign invaders without themselves adopting
despotic methods of rule, the Russians, in the words of
Cyril Black, "to a greater extent than most peoples....
have seen themselves facing a choice of unity under an
autocrat or subjugation by a foreign power." [Ref. 32]
It appears that the Russians accepted authoritarian rule as
a natural outgrowth of their desire for survival, view of
the world, and view of man. This rule was not only
authoritarian in nature but could be termed patrimonial in
character.
The patrimonial form of government is one logical
extension of the peasant family where the father had
autonomous control over all the family's property and pro-
duction. The term, patrimonial, as used to describe a form
of government is defined by Pipes as, "....a regime where the
rights of sovereignty and those of ownership blend to the
point of becoming indistinguishable, and political power is
exercised in the same manner as economic power." [Ref. 33]
One of its most characteristic features is the apparent
absence of distinctions between the state and society at
large, which tends to lead to the nonexistence of individual
rights vis-a-vis the state.
In a patrimonial state the government owns the property.
There are few conflicts between the sovereign's rights and
the individual's rights, for the individual has few rights.
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Pipes describes it in this manner, "A despot violates his
subjects' property rights; a patrimonial leader does not
even acknowledge their existence." [Ref. 34] Thus in a
patrimonial state there appear to be few limits on the
authority of the leader.
In the Russian case power was also exercised in such a
way as to ensure that no countervailing political institutions
would grow which would weaken the grip of the leader. The
relationship between the rulers and the ruled was decidedly
"one-way"
:
There is no evidence. .. .of the mutual obligations binding
prince and his servitor, and therefore, also nothing
resembling legal or moral "rights" of subjects and little
need for law and courts. [Ref. 35]
There were, therefore, few institutional checks on the
arbitrary use of the monarch's power. "The system. .. .was
immune from pressure from below." [Ref. 36]
The method used to exert authority by both the village
and the state was peculiarly Russian in nature. That
authority could be characterized as absolute and arbitrary,
and was often brutally and capriciously applied. Sanctions
which might have been applied by the authority in the village
included beatings, executions, and "letting loose the red
rooster" (burning houses down). [Ref. 37] This brutal and
arbitrary use of power has obvious parallels in the purges
of the 19 30 's.
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Henry Dicks, in his "Observations on Contemporary Russian
Behavior" reports that interviews tend to show that authority
is still viewed in the same manner:
In virtual unaminity the informants talked of Authority
as hard, deprivational and arbitrary or capricious-
unpredictable. This is how a "vlast" (authority, power)
always behaves. If the "vlast" were weak nobody would
obey it, and governments have always to deprive you- tax
you, make demands of goods and services, care nothing
about your welfare, arrest you and push you around at
their whim. [Ref. 38]
This statement is interesting not only for its exposition of
the Russian view of authority but also for its unstated, but
prevalent, view of man as evil or weak, virtually unable to
respond to any but absolute authority.
The concept of authority seems to have extreme power for
the Russian. It seems to be something that must be submitted
to, not because it is right but because it is inevitable.
Morton Schwartz discusses this point in differentiating the
Russian from the American view of authority:
By historical tradition and political ideology the Soviet
people share an understanding of the concept of power and
authority singularly different from that held in the
United States. As Phillip E. Mosely perceptively
observed:
One feature which strikes every foreigner who stays
in the Soviet Union for a substantial length of time
is the great respect, even awe, that is generally
felt for power, for authority. Neither word exactly
expresses the Russian word "vlast" which means power
so great that one cannot oppose it. It can, if one
is skillful, be placated; if one is lucky, it can be
hoodwinked; but cannot be resisted, for there is no




To review, one reason for the tradition of absolute
authoritarianism to arise was as a response to the environ-
mental and historical factors that dictated that a primary
goal of the Russian existence was survival. There are several
characteristics of the methods Russians used to govern them-
selves that are important to the understanding of their
political culture.
The first characteristic is group decision-making by
consensus. Although the viability of the group takes
precedence over the rights of the individual, these group
decisions were reached in a corporate manner. Apparently a
great deal of discussion was allowed during the formation of
a decision. However, once a decision was made community
members were obliged to unanimously support it. Decisions
were reached by ad-hoc councils made up of the heads of
households in a village. Edward Keenan points out that there
appears to have been little formal structure to these groups,
but they seem to have been powerful bodies which dominated
village life. [Ref. 40]
Once decisions were made and successfully implemented,
village political life took on an extraordinarily conservative
character. The primary thrust of decisions was the avoidance
of risk. Keenan describes it like this:
If an innovation offered a short-term improvement of the
standard of living at the cost of an increased risk of
possible calamity, it was rejected. .. .When faced with
danger the village would hunker down-or pick up and move
on-rather than change. [Ref. 41]
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It is important at this point to generalize from some aspects
of the village culture to the court culture so that a greater
understanding of elite political culture may be gained.
It has been stated above that the Russian government
naturally became one that was patrimonial and authoritarian.
It too was concerned with survival - its own political
survival. One method for it to accomplish this was to take
on a conservative viewpoint. Actions were taken which were
designed to ensure its "....survival as a distinct and
effective political and economic unit...." [Ref. 42] Many
mechanisms arose during this time and can be seen as enhancing
this survival-centralization, secrecy and deception among
them.
From its inception the Russian government appears to have
been highly centralized. Important to the operation of the
system was the presence of at least the illusion of an all-
powerful Tsar at the center. This central prop was one
reason that the system could operate under weak, incompetent
even mad Tsars for, "....it mattered little, in most gener-
ations, who was at the center of this system, but it was
crucially important that someone be, and that allegiance to
him be at least nominally unconditional." [Ref. 43/emphasis
in original]
The idea of a strong Tsar was a mainstay of the legiti-
mization of the power and position of the princely Boyar clans,
who participated in the decision-making, and the politically
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neutral bureaucracy who carried out those decisions. The
myth of a strong Tsar also helped to level the competing
interests at court in such a manner that the system could
not become unbalanced by one clan. The maintenance of the
system helped ensure the power positions of the clans so they
appeared eager to perpetuate it.
The necessity for the maintenance of the strong Tsar
myth also led to the building up of the deception of his
omnipotence. Most foreigners saw a constant picture of an
all-powerful Tsar who was treated as omnipotent by even the
most powerful of his Boyars. On the contrary, decisions
appear to have been reached in the same secret, ad-hoc,
consensus conscious manner that served as the basis for
decision-making throughout the Russian culture. The deception
was probably used to ensure the survival of the system in the
face of changes in conditions.
It is the conservative, centralized character of the
Russian government, perpetuated by deception and secrecy,
born from a harsh climatic and historical environment that
allows paranoia to become a major trait of Russian political
culture. Again it seems to begin with survival, as noted by
Morton Schwartz:
Complete discipline and service to the state-no "society"
outside the state- was the price seen as necessary for
survival. It also produced, not surprisingly, an idio-
syncratic view of the outside world, characterized in
large measure by suspicion and fear. [Ref. 44]
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This paranoia appears to permeate most aspects of political
behavior. It has taken myriad forms throughout Russian
history from the consistent difficulties in allowing Russians
access to foreign ideas, either by restricting access to
foreigners themselves or by declaring domestic and foreign
news a state secret; to the "everyone is against us" attitude
of the modern Soviet state.
Our interpretation has been that the Russian culture
grew out of environmental conditions that dictated that life
was a struggle for survival. The possibility of success of
this struggle was enhanced by the subordination of the
individual to the group. One method to ensure group survival
was to enact strict control measures over weak and dangerous
individuals. At the state level these measures were manifested
by the existence of a tradition of authoritarianism and
patrimonialism. The state took control of its subjects'
existence. In its parallel search for institutional survival
the state took on a conservative outlook, its actions being
designed more to foster its perpetuation than to serve its
citizens. In so doing the state appeared to take on the basic
personality of the prevalent culture; closed, secretive,
jilevious and paranoid.
This is one legacy of the traditional Russian political
culture. Of equal importance to the analysis of the Soviet




B. MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY AND THE SOVIET POLITICAL
CULTURE
As was stated in the introduction the role of ideology
in the behavior of the Soviet leadership is a subject of
some controversy. It is a thesis of this study that Marxist-
Leninist ideology has become an integral part of the Soviet
political culture and has an important influence on the
behavior of the Soviet leadership. Robert Conquest sees it
this way:
In the West, Soviet concern with ideology is often not
taken seriously. On the contrary .... it constitutes the
crux. Nor is it a matter of merely holding a particular
political opinion: the attitudes of the Soviet leadership
are not simply based on ideas in some abstract sense
—
they are soaked into its bones. [Ref. 45]
This section will discuss why Soviet behavior is ideologically
based, how ideology influences elite behavior and what the
major ideological points which affect Soviet political culture
are.
The Soviets devote a great deal of time and effort to
linking current policy and behavior to previous Marxist-
Leninist pronouncements. As R. Judson Mitchell says; "Even
if this is a purely formal exercise, its persistence indicates
that ideological sources influence characteristic behavior in
the political system." [Ref. 46]
It is important to identify some uses of ideology in the
political system. Mitchell discusses three basic tenets of
doctrine which are ideological in nature:
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First, since its inception with Lenin, Soviet ideology
has above all justified control of society by the party.
Second, the ideology has consistently postulated a
linkage between foreign and domestic variables, main-
taining a total world view of the theoretical inter-
connection of all sociopolitical structures. Finally,
there is the perennial view of a global polarization
of social forces, of a competition among social systems.
[Ref. 47]
Therefore, ideology serves to justify the power of the
political elite, and helps form the structure through which
world events are analyzed. Because ideology legitimizes the
leadership it appears to be essential to its survival, and
is an example of the tie between the Soviet ideology and the
traditional Russian political culture.
The Marxist dialectic emphasizes that struggle in all
facets of life is constant. "The concept is both Marxist
and deeply Russian, that life-people, nature, the elements,
ideas- is in a constant state of struggle." [Ref. 48] In
the dialectic all things are interrelated but are in constant
conflict, there is a never ending chain of development.
External stability has little place in this reasoning. The
chain of historical development will inexorably lead to the
"workers paradise". Stephen P. Gibert shows how this dynamic
view of social change affects the world view of the Soviet
leaders
:
* Soviet leaders see themselves as "men of the future";
* Russia's elites are confident that communism will
ultimately prevail. There is no need, accordingly,
to take unnecessary risks;
* Social developments follow objective laws;
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* It is possible to develop a complete understanding of
reality by means of a systematic approach; everything
has its own inner logic;
* Management of global change can be accomplished by the
Soviet leaders, since they understand the origins,
development and direction of social forces. [Ref. 49]
These points summarize some important ideological under-
pinnings of Soviet political behavior--polarization between
social systems, correlation of forces, the natural progression
of history, the Soviet view of time, the supremacy of the
party, and universality of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. These
are the major ideological points which affect Soviet political
behavior and will now be discussed.
The Soviet leader seems to see the struggle between
different social systems as inevitable. This struggle takes
place on many levels and is the basis of many interactions
in the international arena. Everything is interrelated. This
polarization concept serves to form the foundation from which
events are judged. This fact is often confusing to external
observers, as Nathan Leites points out:
....the Politburo in its interpretations of the world
outside often seems to perceive connections between
events where we see none; to regard unrelated details
as symptomatic of major political trends; and to
believe that there is complicated planning behind what
we know to be fortuitous....
Although the Politburo is realistic in dealing with
the immediate consequences, military and industrial, of
new technologies, it tends to feel that the essentials
in human affairs-seen in terms of "capitalism",
"socialism", "communism" -have not changed. [Ref. 50]
The process of the struggle between the different social
systems is analyzed by the use of the correlation of forces.
40

To the Soviet the correlation of forces is the method of
measuring the across-the-board strength of the different
social systems. Since everything is interrelated the Soviets
see their measurement of the correlation, which includes
factors other than just the military balance, as an accurate
depiction of the state of the world. One observer describes
it in this manner:
Soviet theoreticians maintain that correlation of forces
provides a conceptual framework more conducive to accurate
measurement than does the "balance of power" approach.
In the Soviet view, Western practitioners of balance of
power analysis engage in highly impressionistic assessments
of the weights of power factors, while Soviet correlation
analysts carefully, precisely calculate the weights of
factors identified by scientific procedures .... Soviet
analysts list four main categories of factors in the
correlation of forces: economic, military, political
and international movements. ... Its primary importance,
however, is probably not its value as an indicator but
the attention it focuses on the presumed inevitable
competition between systems. [Ref. 51]
This global view of the correlation of forces seems to fit
nicely with the Russian trait of distrusting outsiders.
Since struggle occurs on all levels, contact with foreigners
must be avoided lest they exert a corrupting influence.
Another basic Marxist tenet which influences Soviet
behavior is the immutable march of history in the socialist
direction. This is what is known as "scientific socialism",
the view that the march of history proceeds not "as a wild
whirl of senseless deeds of violence", to quote Engels, but
according to basic laws which Marx is said to have discovered,
[Ref. 52] Politically significant events are explainable by
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these laws, nothing occurs by accident. The true interpreter
of these natural laws is the party and its leadership. It
seems to be important to the legitimization of the party that
these interpretations appear correct, and that the state's
behavior appears to be based upon them.
An important corollary to this "march of history" is the
Soviet view of time, which also serves as a good example of
the blending of Marxism and traditional Russian political
culture. Since there is a constant movement of historical
development there is little need to worry about time schedules.
"What came later was assumed to be. .. .better; setbacks
were only temporary, the reverse stroke of an historic
spiral that had only one direction-upward to a higher
level." [Ref. 53]
Since a primary goal of the traditional Russian was
survival, he had only to endure as long as he could, a
situation in which time schedules had little meaning. He
consequently developed great patience. This combination of
the Marxist view of gradualism with the inherent Russian
patience is important because it seems to manifest itself in
many ways in current Soviet political behavior. The Sovie t
negotiating style of consistently outlasting its American
counterparts is but one example
.
While the timing of historical events is not predictable,
their general movement in the socialist direction is inevitable
But Marxism-Leninism is also an activist ideology, and as such




However, it is a task of the Party to shorten as much as
possible the road to (and hence the cost of) victory....
This can be done because at many historical junctures
more than one outcome is "objectively possible". "Objective
conditions" create certain "opportunities" for the Party;
whether the Party will succeed in "utilizing" them and
transforming them into "realities" cannot be predicted.
[Ref. 54]
One result of this neat juxtaposition of logic is that
the leadership can see failures in terms of improper timing-
the objective conditions not being favorable when the failure
occurred; while success affirms the inevitability of historical
movement. It appears important to the survival of the party
leadership that it cling to this particular point of the
ideology, because this sense of timing seems to be deeply
ingrained in the political culture.
The role of the party is important to the understanding
of the Soviet political culture. The party appears to be
essential to the operation of Marxism-Leninism in the USSR.
It serves as the central focus of the ideology, the reposi-
tory of the wisdom about the inevitable progression of history.
It should most probably be the center of decision-making in
the Communist state. However, from about the end of Stalin's
purges the party aparatus in general-like the bureaucracy and
the military- seems to serve an outwardly significant, but
somewhat less important function in the realm of major poli-




It appears that this is another example of the operation
of Soviet political culture which has direct parallels to
the traditional Russian culture. In that culture the myth
of the omnipotence of the Tsar was promoted in an attempt to
cover the actual extent of the power resident in the inner
circle of boyars surrounding him. Currently the appearance
of a semi-democratic decision-making procedure in the party
seems to serve as a cover for the virtually absolute power
which resides in the Politburo.
Both the inner circle of boyars and the Politburo seem
to have similar operating principles. They share the same
group of basic characteristics which we have attributed to
the great Russian political culture—they are informal,
corporate, avoid risk, and appear paranoid. These examples
serve to show a continuity in the political culture despite
the introduction of a radical ideology. The Marxist-Leninist
ideology combined with the legacy of the Great Russian political
culture is one basis for the hybrid which is the Soviet poli-
tical culture.
Along these lines it is important to note that the
victorious faction which survived the chaos of the Russian
civil war appears to have been the one with the closest
resemblance to the historical culture:
....among the organizations and trends that had competed
for hegemony in the revolutionary period, it was the
Bolshevik party whose creed of centralism, elitism and
conspiratorial rule was most compatible with traditional
patterns, that became the principle agent and benificiary
of the reestablishment of political stability. [Ref. 55]
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This would appear to be an obviously logical occurrence, the
ideology reinforcing the underlying culture.
Marxism-Leninism can also be seen as being universalist
in nature. As the end of the inevitable historical movement
Marxist-Leninist goals and methods are thought by the
Soviets to be the only true destiny of mankind. However,
there is also a strong tradition of universalism prevalent
in Russian history. During his interviews with Soviet
citizens, Dicks uncovered a modern manifestation of Russian
universalism:
Every now and again we get glimpses of the persistence
of old, deep beliefs and aspirations regarding the "special
mission" of the Russian people to supercede the morbid,
oversophisticated civilization of the west; a belief in
the superiority of Russian strength, capacity to endure
hardship, cunning, and inventiveness, and virtuous contempt
for the enfeebling timidity that springs from attachment
to physical possessions. [Ref. 56]
It appears that the tightly closed system which has
prospered throughout Russian history might have spawned this
universalist view of the world.
Like the ruler of Old Muscovy, they tend to see themselves
as the bearers of a unique message and the center of a
new, higher civilization. Now as in the past Moscow
proclaims itself an example to all peoples.
These beliefs, rooted in history and buttressed by
ideology, give rise to. ... striking personality
traits. ... ideological exclusiveness always breeds
xenophobia. Evidence of this abhorrence of foreign
values is still. ... very much present. Thus, like
their Muscovite ancestors, the Soviet leaders seem




We will also see a strong universalist tradition as one of
the major tenets of the American political culture.
Some additional words on what we have loosely termed
Soviet paranoia are appropriate. It has been shown above
that the fear of invasion has been virtually constant
throughout Russian history. In part, this might be responsi-
ble for the Russian obsession with survival and thus the
growth of the closed, conservative system which engenders
suspicion of outsiders and what we have called paranoia.
Today this paranoia manifests itself in the Soviet preoccu-
pation with the security of its borders and its sense of
being "picked on" by the rest of the world.
This feeling that everyone is against them colors their
views and is ingrained in their actions. It permeates Lenin,
who felt (possibly with good reason) that the major capitalist
powers were intent on the destruction of the fledgling Soviet
state. However Lenin seems to build the conspiracy out of
proportion to its actual strength:
....all events in world politics .... are concentrated
around one central point, viz., the struggle of the
world bourgeoisie against the Soviet Russian Republic.
[Ref. 58]
Since the world has ganged up on them everyone who was
not an ally was considered an enemy. George Kennan states
this eloquently:
There is no border zone of Russian power. The jealous
and intolerant eyes of the Kremlin can distinguish, in
the end, only vassals and enemies; and the neighbors of
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Russia, if they do not wish to be the one, must reconcile
themselves to being the other. [Ref. 59]
Enemies like this are not only external but also thrive
internally in the Soviet Union and must be constantly watched
for so that they might not destroy the state. Nathan Leites
points this out:
Incessant and all-seeing vigilance are essential if
mistakes which might "open a path" into the Party for
enemies are to be avoided. Not only must no "door" be
"open" to them, but there must not be the smallest
"crack" through which some "worm" could "creep". [Ref. 60]
The object of this incessant vigilance is anyone who might
be a threat. Note the Russianness in this quote by Lenin:
Any group not controlled by the Party, both at home and
abroad, is an enemy.
. .
.
[Lenin said] keep in mind that
this is an unreliable friend (and hence an enemy)
.
[Ref. 61]
It is, of course, Stalin who exemplifies this trait of seeing
enemies at every turn. His brutal purges enforcing collecti-
vization, of the foreign policy and military organizations in
in the 1930' s, and the so-called "doctor's purge" ongoing at
his death are prime examples of the manner in which internal
enemies were treated. The fates of Gomulka in Poland, the
Bulgarian Rostov, Rajk in Hungary among countless other
Eastern Europeans in the late 19 40*s shows that Stalin's
paranoia did not stop at the border. [Ref. 62]
But these examples cannot just be explained away as the
excesses of a madman. They are consistent with the behavior
of Soviet and Russian leaders throughout history. Khrushchev's
manner in dealing with Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovic, and even
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his savior Zhukov, while bloodless, also shows this paranoid
trait at work, as does the current practice of exiling or
expelling dissidents. [Ref. 63]
In addition to influencing the Soviets to see enemies
all around this paranoia also leads them to make claims that
most Americans might consider irrational. Two examples,
written by Soviet academics for an American audience are
representative
:
The use of the atomic weapon was of no military significance;
it had a different purpose- to demonstrate it, and to try
to intimidate the Soviet Union. That is how American
atomic blackmail had its start. [Ref. 64]
Kennedy was firmly convinced that a balance of power
between the United States and the USSR was intolerable,
that it was essential to achieve a decisive superiority
over the Soviet Union. For the sake of speeding up the
armaments race he was prepared to misinterpret everything ,
[emphasis mine Ref. 65~
These statements would be labled as patently ridiculous by
many Americans but are indicative of a Soviet view of the
world, a view it is essential to understand if their actions
in the world arena are to be properly understood.
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE
The preceeding discussion has been aimed at building a
case for the description of the Soviet political culture. It
is the purpose of this thesis to build this model for both
the Soviet and American political cultures and then apply it
to the INF negotiations as both a method for describing each
government's position there, and as a predictor for the
48

reactions of one government to the other. Because political
culture is a subconscious framer of attitudes the model built
should be general in nature. For this reason we will stress
attitudinal nuances over a "cookbook" approach in the political
stereotype we are about to build.
With these qualifications in mind a discussion of some
primary concerns of the Soviet elite political culture follows.
These are generalizations, and while certainly not accurate
descriptions of individual members of the elite, serve to
accentuate the areas of cultural influence. This will be
useful in applying the stereotype built here to the INF
negotiations.
The Soviet leadership will be concerned first and foremost
with the survival of the state, with the security of the USSR.
Threats to this security will be seen as a tightly controlled
and interrelated conspiracy whose design is the destruction
of the Soviet state.
These threats will be met on all levels by a united front
whose purpose is to control the environment so that chaos may
be averted and survival assured. These threats will be taken
seriously and met with a vast array of weapons directed at
softening the adversary across the board and finding his weak
link so that it may be attacked relentlessly. These views of
struggle on all fronts and searching for the weakest link
come directly from Lenin:
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....The whole of political life is an endless chain
consisting of an infinite number of links. The whole
art of politics lies in finding the link that can be
least torn out of our hands.... and having found it,
cling to that link as tightly as possible. [Ref. 66]
Our stereotypical Soviet leader will see his adversary
as evil, as needing to be controlled. He will assume that
his adversary will make tough decisions based on the end
result and not be particularly concerned with the means to
those ends. Because of this mirror- image the Soviet leader
will be inclined to respond in kind. This response will use
deception as a major tactic, hiding both strengths and
weaknesses in an effort to manipulate the other side. An
example from the Korean Airliner incident in September 19 83,
is illustrative. The insistence by the Soviets that the
Korean airliner was on a spy mission for the U.S. and thus
liable to be attacked can be seen as a mirror image of their
own use of commercial airliners.
It appears to be important to the Soviets that they
control the tempo of any interaction. In a negotiation,
concessions would be on relatively minor points, which would
be portrayed in the propaganda as major and unmatched by the
other side. Concessions even remotely related to the core-
issue, the survival of the USSR, would be made only in extreme
circumstances, after all other options have been exhausted.
Lenin was specific about concessions:
....the concessions we grant, which we are forced to
grant, are the continuation of war in another form,
by other means. [Ref. 67]
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Decisions appear to be normally made by the Politburo on
all aspects of the conflict, so that local representatives
would have little independent power to explore avenues of
agreement. An example of this is the now famous "Walk in the
Woods" agreement between the Soviet and American negotiators
in Geneva in 19 82. This was a tentative guideline for
agreement reached by the top level negotiators at the INF
talks in which both sides made concessions. The concessions
made by the Soviet negotiator, Ambassador Kvitsinsky, were
overruled by the Soviet government ("with vehemence" is the
description used for the rejection by the former head of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow [Ref. 68]).
It should also be noted that the U.S. government rejected
some of the terms of the tentative agreement arrived at during
the "Walk in the Woods".
These, then, are some of the effects of the political
culture on the Soviet leadership. This leader is one who
believes in the dominance of the group over the individual.
To this leader survival of the state is all important, and
considerations of morality, legality, or truthfulness should
not be allowed to interfere. This leader believes he is
surrounded on all sides by enemies as committed to his
destruction as he is to his own survival. In order to
survive this leader must exert iron control over the situation,
for to loosen his grip is to invite chaos. His major adversary
is socialized in the American political culture, which is
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different in background and viewpoint. The next chapter will
attempt to define this culture.
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III. AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE
As we mentioned in the introduction American political
culture was formed in both a natural and political environ-
ment that was significantly different from that of the Soviet
political culture. The culture was allowed to evolve in a
relatively peaceful framework, mostly free from outside
interference.
As we did in chapter two we will generally state the
cultural points which evolved in this framework. They are:
1. Americans appear to be generally moralistic and
idealistic but somewhat less ideological in nature
than the Soviets;
2. Americans tend to believe themselves to be rational
and pragmatic, and think in a legalistic manner;
3. Americans place a strong emphasis on the universality
of their method of problem solution;
4. Americans tend to pay more attention to events
which are contemporary in nature rather than
concerning themselves with specific plans for
the future or living in the past;
5. Stability, the status quo and peaceful change are
important for Americans in the international arena.
These are the specific assumptions which we will discuss
about the American political culture.
A. AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE DESCRIBED
Contrary to the Soviet political culture the American
culture is not based on several centuries of evolution in a
relatively static environment, but can be seen as being born
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as a unique entity slightly over two centuries ago. Peter
Conrad in his Imagining America, sees America from a foreign
perspective and captures this point:
As [H.G.] Wells says, while modern European states
haphazardly evolved, "The United States were planned and
made" by those rational, historically guiltless gestures
commemorated in the constitutional preamble. In 149 2,
America was merely discovered, in 1776, it was invented-
or rather it imagined itself for the first time. Invention
is a mechanical initiative, interrupting and accelerating
the sluggish drift of history. [Ref. 69]
Americans like to see themselves as new, unique, made-up
of the best parts of a combination of traditions, but
beholding to none of them:
The legacy of America's past is a heritage of separation-
not only a physical separating between the New World and
the traditional centers of world politics, but a moral
distance, a willed and self-conscious separation of a
"segment" divorced from its European background. This
segment has quickly and constantly resorted to a
celebration of its uniqueness .... [Ref . 70]
Historically, the American emphasis has been on the indi-
vidual's relationship with the environment,
....each man had to contend with the forces of nature
for his success .... He would be self-reliant and
independent of others. ... They did not have to live out
predetermined lives as they would have had to do in
Europe. [Ref. 71]
This led to less of an emphasis on corporate survival than
the Russians showed.
The uniqueness of the American experience leads to a
fundamental belief in its own exceptionalism. A quote from
George Ball is illustrative:
As Carl Becker pointed out many years ago, we borrowed
heavily from the Judaic idea of a chosen people. We
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were the "city on.... a hill," what both Hegel and
Tocqueville referred to as "the land of the future."
[Ref. 72]
This view probably stems from a different view of man than
the Soviets have, a view that appears to be more positive in
nature.
One view of man from the American perspective is specified
by Harold Laswell:
In his list of democratic character qualities he includes;
(1) an "open ego", by which he means a warm and inclusive
attitude toward other human beings; (2) a capacity for
sharing values with others; (3) a multi-valued rather
than a single-valued orientation; (4) trust and confidence
in the human environment; and (5) relative freedom from
anxiety. [Ref. 73]
This view leads to some assumptions about authority, the
capabilities of individuals, and the purpose of government
that strongly influence political views.
In general, authority does not reside in the government
but is delegated to the government by the sovereign people.
Because of this it is within the competence of these people
to remove that authority from the individuals exercising it.
As Ronald Reagan says, "Government exists for their [the
citizen's] convenience, not the other way around." [Ref. 74]
This primary view of man as "good" and of authority emanating
from him is one of the central themes of the American political
culture.
Because man, in general, and American man in particular,
is "good", the preservation and enhancement of that goodness
becomes a primary goal of the political system. This leads
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to one of the most pervasive of American political cultural
traits, moralism.
The American political culture is permeated with moralism.
It is constantly there, from President Reagan's moral pro-
nouncements about the "evil empire" of communism, to the
liberal's opposition to the Vietnam war on moral grounds.
Americans not only appear to see themselves as moral but
strive to act in a moral manner, or at least explain their
actions in moral terms. Margaret Mead describes the American
passion for moralism in this manner:
To have a moral character does not mean to be good, but
it means to think that goodness is transcendently
important, that there is a right and a wrong and that
in the end all final decisions must be made in terms
of what is right and what is wrong. [Ref. 75]
It is important to Americans to believe that they have
right on their side in their dealings with other nations. A
subset of their actual moralism is the virtual requirement
that things political be seen in moral terms. American
principles and ideals tend to assume the strength of moral
imperatives, expressions of cherished beliefs. Examples
like this from Washington's Farewell Address are common in
American political thought:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
prosperity, religion and morality are indispensible
supports. .. .And let us with caution indulge the
supposition that morality can be maintained without
religion. .. .Reason and experience both forbid us to
expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion
of religious principle. [Ref. 76]
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This moralism is ingrained in the American political
culture. It is not merely rhetorical. It is one logical
outgrowth of the unique political framework and history of
the United States. This moralistic viewpoint contains an
idealism and a sense of mission that appears as uniquely
American. Richard B. Morris sums up:
Fundamental to the character of the American Revolution
was the notion that the people were sovereign and that a
republican system of government based upon their consent
was innately superior to any other prevailing system. As
the Founding Fathers envisioned it, their republic would
prove more virtuous than systems embracing hereditary or
caste principles of authority. It would command greater
moral discipline. It would be more immediately concerned
with the welfare of society, and, since the people were
sovereign, it would more surely command their allegiance
than other systems. Such a republic, they felt, was
tailor-made for America, with its exceptional advantages,
its boundless resources, and its immense distance from the
Old World. Granted that a republican order had a better
chance to put down roots in America, the Founding Fathers
confidently expected that its success would serve as a
model for all mankind. Thus, a sense of mission was from
the start embedded in the national purpose. [Ref. 77]
Examples of the American proclivity to view the world in
moral terms abound throughout its history. More directly
pertinent to this thesis, the presidents in this century have
carried on the tradition. Obvious examples run from Wilson's
Fourteen Points to Carter's human rights policies.
Of equal importance is the perceived necessity to attach
moral rhetoric to policies that might be driven more by
superpower pragmatism. Stanley Hoffman discusses this:
The deliberate transposition of policies decided on
grounds of power or national interest into the language
of principle thus corresponds to two characteristic
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assumptions: that this is the language that best moves
the American people because it is its own; and that it
is likely to be the most effective abroad. The first
assumption reflects an experience, the second only a
conviction. [Ref. 78]
The use of moralistic rhetoric to explain American actions,
particularly, it seems, in this hemisphere, may be seen in
Theodore Roosevelt's appeal to moralism with regard to the
Panama Canal, in Lyndon Johnson's explanation of the Dominican
Republic incursion in 196 5, and more recently in Ronald Reagan's
discussion of the invasion of (or "rescue mission" in) Grenada.
A common thread running through these examples is the perceived
need for the American position to be, or seem to be, on the
side of right, while the actions themselves could be seen as
being more pragmatic in nature.
This point is emphasized by Robert Dallek as he describes
Roosevelt's actions in this way:
Roosevelt's appeal to moral considerations for what some
saw as immoral actions was but one of the several ironies
in the progressive mood and world view. Not only had the
United States casually overridden Columbia's legitimate
self-interest and ignored customary international legal
and moral constraints for the sake of a higher good, but
it had also favored revolutionary disorder in the name of
order and described its imperial control of a canal zone
as Panamanian self-rule. [Ref. 79]
It is not really the hypocrisy that is important here but the
virtual requirement that the action be seen as stemming from
moral considerations. One corollary to the strong moral strain
seen in the U.S. political culture is the existence of an
equally strong idealistic influence.
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Woodrow Wilson's famous quote is indicative of the extent
of American idealism:
Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well, that is the
way I know I am an American. America is the only idealist
nation in the world. [Ref. 80]
Idealism, like moralism, permeates American thought and
rhetoric. Americans tend to believe in this idealism and,
in most cases, demand that their politicians do so also.
The American public, says Stanley Hoffman, "....wants some
idealism in its foreign policy." [Ref. 81]
It might be said that Richard Nixon's "sin" in Watergate
was not necessarily that he was caught committing serious
criminal acts, but more likely that he destroyed the public's
trust in the morality of its president. It was, perhaps, his
perceived wanton disregard for the ideal of presidential
morality that led to the erosion of support which ultimately
caused his resignation.
For many Americans this ideal takes the form of the need
for a national purpose, one seen in this manner:
Our national purpose consists of a commitment to seek a
set of lofty goals. Premised on belief in the value of
respect for the essential dignity of the individual human
being, our national aspirations relate primarily to
liberty, equality, and justice. From this perspective the
touchstone of government is the degree to which its
activities do not impede but, if anything, facilitate and
enhance each person's ability to realize his or her
potentialities, to pursue happiness. [Ref. 82]
It is an important factor to the political longevity of
American politicians that they believe in this purpose, at
least in rhetoric if not in action.
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As was stated above this idealism, moralism, and national
purpose is not a direct result of a strictly interpreted
ideology, defined here as a set of ideas and symbols which
give the believers a systematic, almost programmed view of
the world and which is institutionalized in the governmental
machinery. This distinction is important for it indicates
that America's principles are general sets of ideas which set
the tone for, but do not necessarily prescribe action.
Americans believe in "human-rights" and "self-determination"
and any number of other ideals which may be characterized as
abstract principles rather than strict guides for action. The
definition of the American ideal of "human-rights" certainly
seems to have changed from the Carter to the Reagan adminis-
tration, while the commitment to the ideal still remains.
One way to think of American principles is as a relatively
loose set of solutions to the problems which have afflicted
Americans throughout their history. These solutions can be
seen as resulting from unique American qualities- know-how,
perseverance, ingenuity, and even goodness. These principles
were not necessarily set down beforehand as a strict ideology
but continue to evolve and grow with American experience.
This has spawned a method of dealing with problems may be
described as rational and pragmatic. "Ours is a how-to-do-it
society, and not a what-to-do society." [Ref. 83] The general
American method of solving problems is to break them into
simple elements and then solve them by what Stanley Hoffman
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calls "skill thinking", an engineering or mechanistic approach
to problem solution. Once the problems are taken down to
their most basic level they are solved, to a large extent, by
formulas which prescribe general solutions over a wide range
of options.
As will be discussed below skill thinking poses some
difficulties to its users:
....reliance on formulas makes one think by analogy—a
very dangerous habit which is aggravated in the American
case by the presence in the government of many lawyers,
who are used to reasoning in terms of precedents.
Analogical reasoning singles out, in the two complex
events being compared, features that are common to both
and suggests that since they were essential in the first
case they must be decisive in the second. [Ref. 84]
Issues tend to be fragmented into compartments which can
be solved by this formula thinking. However, there is no
guarantee that the correct formula is being applied or even
that the problem is capable of being solved in this manner.
Another difficulty is that even if the component problems
can be solved, their interrelatedness is not necessarily
addressed. George Liska describes the elite political culture
in the United States as having:
....a stake in segregating issues into either technically
or tactically definable and manageable slices of space,
time or function. Their assumption is that such issues
are separable and, when separated, can be mechanically
reassembled into a coherent grand strategy. [Ref. 85]
This tendency to misunderstand the synergistic effect of these
"slices" may lead to an overreliance on the ability to solve




A prime example is President Carter's human rights and
arms sales policies. The officially stated policy of the
Carter Administration was spelled out by the State Department
in 1978:
The U.S. is seeking to integrate human rights considerations
into its bilateral and multilateral relationships as a key
element in decision making.... We wish to develop a policy
permitting a case-by-case approach to improve human rights
situations in the most effective way possible. [Ref. 86]
This case-by-case approach is an example of compartmentalizing
the human rights issue out of the overall strategy of dealing
with major foreign policy problems, that of relations among
individual nations and the proliferation of arms sales to
those nations. [Ref. 87]
By compartmentalizing the question of what America can do
to help the cause of human rights worldwide and then using as
one method of solving the problem the denial of arms sales to
rights violators the Carter administration alienated many third
world countries. This could have done more harm to U.S.
interests than good. For example, Brazil chose not to accept
American arms shipments which were tied to changes in its
human rights policies and almost immediately fulfilled its arms
needs from other sources (primarily Israel and France, but
also Libya). [Ref. 88]
The American penchant for rationality appears to be the
key here. The American brand of rationality in the human
rights example was simple. The formula was if a country would
not stop 'violating its citizen's rights the U.S. would stop
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selling them arms. This presumably would bring the violating
country to its senses and rights violations would stop.
That many third world countries saw this as another
example of American paternalism and an interference in their
internal affairs does not seem to have been initially important
to the framers of the policy. The policy can be seen as an
attempt to apply the American brand of rationality to that
situation, a rationality that might not have fit.
Hoffman's legalism can be seen as a combination of
American moralism and rationality. It is one point of pride
that Americans live in a society of laws, not men. Since
laws govern the behavior of civilized people it follows that
human interaction should be guided by those laws. Again the
example of the American commitment to International Law and
Organizations shows the belief in the rule of law.
In addition to the pitfalls of analogical thinking dis-
cussed above, Americans can seriously misjudge a situation by
attempting to place it into a legal framework. American
insistence on on-site inspection during disarmament negotiations,
in addition to a showing a well-deserved lack of trust in the
Russians, is indicative of this legalism.
The belief appears to be that if the Soviets can be caught
breaking the agreement they will be liable to universal
condemnation because they "broke the law" . That the Soviet
objection to inspection may not necessarily come from a desire
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to cover up the breaking of the agreement but from a sincere,
culturally determined, fear that their security might be
breached appears to be overshadowed by the pervasive influence
of legalism in the American attitude.
Legalism is a strong force in American foreign policy.
Two reflections of this are in the idealistic establishment
of the League of Nations and the United Nations, both American
ideas. These organizations can be seen as expressions of
faith in International Law, that man can control conflict by
organizing into a framework based on legal principles.
With regard to American/Soviet relations Robert Dallek
sees a strong thread of legalism in the nonrecognition policy
which dominated U.S. -Soviet relations for over a decade after
the Russian Revolution:
The nonrecognition policy toward the Soviets rested on the
belief that Russia was not a civilized nation-that is, not
one that paid its debts, honored agreements, and renounced
international revolution. As the historian Christopher
Lasch has explained, it was a widely held view that the
United States "could have relations only with a regime
which shared its own attitudes and assumptions about the
world." [Ref. 89]
The pervasiveness of legalism is a significant point in
the American culture. An excellent example showing the
unconscious impact of legalism on American political behavior
is in this rather lengthy quote from Adam Ulam regarding
President Truman's political problems with the Progressive
Henry Wallace during the 1948 presidential campaign:
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Truman publically characterized "Uncle Joe" [Stalin] as
a man essentially of good will but thwarted by the
Politburo, of which he was a prisoner. And on the eve
of the election, it was proposed to refute Wallace's
charges that Truman had betrayed Roosevelt's heritage
of American-Soviet friendship by the dramatic gesture
of sending Chief Justice Vinson as Presidential Envoy
to Stalin. . .
.
But why should the Chief Justice go on the mission?
Truman's explanation is of great psychological interest:
"If we could only get Stalin to unburden himself to
someone on our side he could trust, I thought we could
get somewhere." Why, might a foreigner wonder, should
Stalin trust Justice Vinson, a man completely unknown
to him, of no experience and background in foreign
affairs? Well, in the American secular, legalistic
system, the judiciary comes closest to what is in other
societies the Established Church, and the Chief Justice
serves as a symbol of judiciousness, probity, and
independence from political considerations. But it did
not occur to Truman, who was a man straightforward
enough to think of the mission as not merely an
electoral gimmick, that there was no reason in the
world for Stalin or anybody else abroad to view the
Chief Justice in that light and to discuss politics
with him, let alone unburden himself. [Ref. 90]
Another theme which arises frequently in American foreign
policy is that of universalism. We have already seen a strong
strain of it in the Soviet culture, but it appears to be an
even stronger influence in the American culture. This
universalism seems to come from the American belief in their
history of success. The logic seems to be that those
principles which have contributed to American success should
be applied universally to solve all of the world's problems.
George Liska sees this universalist strain as having
negative connotations, as preventing Americans from treating
the Russian state as a "normal" state. In order to accomplish
this it is important for Americans to:
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....relinquish the presumption of their own uniqueness
and thus look upon themselves as just another group of
people on the historical treadmill. They will not
truly accept the essential continuity that exists
between Soviet Russia and tsarist Russia but also all
other great powers until they have given up the view
of themselves as endowed with both capacity and the
right to save the world from itself--and from history.
[Ref. 91]
One manifestation of American universalism is in its view
of negotiations. It seems that Americans believe that if men
of good will sit down with each other and negotiate in good
faith, the consensus solution will have something for every-
body. That this fair-minded method might not yield an optimum
solution to members of other cultures seems to be less
important to most Americans than the practice of reaching the
solution by the American method:
The assumption of normalcy of consensus has often led
American statesmen to offer friendship to foes of the
United States on the condition that they recognize the
universal validity of American principles. We do not
think we are asking a humilating concession of them:
once they have "mended their ways" they will become
partners in the task of ordering the world and will see
that their interests are better served thereby .... [Ref . 92]
Americans, as other nationalities, have a very difficult
time seeing the world as others might see it. Americans also
have difficulty seeing their environment and the circumstances
of their history as special considerations which might have
made their success record possible.
Americans seem to think, and preach, that their principles
are responsible for their successes, and can thus be applied
to the rest of the world. This is an example of a simplistic
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world view, one which is exacerbated by the inherent drive
for simplicity in the American mechanistic problem solving
method, and the inbred simplicity of its moral view of the
world. De Tocqueville observed this over 20 years ago:
The practice which obtains amongst the Americans, of
fixing the standard of their judgment in themselves
alone, leads them to other habits of mind. As they
perceive they succeed in resolving without assistance
all the little difficulties which their practical life
presents, they readily conclude that everything in the
world may be explained, and that nothing in it transcends
the limits of the understanding. [Ref. 93]
Thus American pragmatism and universalism seem to lead
to another cultural trait, simplicity. Skill thinking breaks
problems down into their smallest, and simplest, components.
These small problems are then relatively easily solved. Since
Americans seem to believe that they solve problems easily it
is a logical extension to see those solutions as universally
applicable.
George Liska sees this as a trait caused both by the
American culture and the requirements of policymaking in a
pluralistic society:
He [the elective statesman] perceives the vast public as
needing to see issues starkly polarized in ways that are
easy to grasp intellectually, are gratifying, or at least
not offending emotionally, and are neutral in terms of
whatever social or ethnic cleavages may beset his own
political system internally. [Ref. 94]
Regardless of the cause of the importance of a simplistic
world view, one result is that Americans tend to view the
same events from a different perspective than those who have
a more complicated view of the world, for example the Soviets.
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This simplistic world view takes many forms, the afore-
mentioned League of Nations and United Nations are simple
(in concept) , legalistic solutions to world conflict. Another
example of the pervasiveness of simplicity and legalism is
the 1928 Kellog-Briand Peace Pact which outlawed war. To its
supporters the solution to war probably appeared simple,
outlaw it and then bring the force of international law and
public opinion to legitimize the ban.
This penchant for oversimplification is in conflict with
the interrelatedness of the Soviet view. R. Judson Mitchell
sees it as working to the disadvantage of the Americans in
some cases
:
....the most important advantage accruing to the Soviets....
lies in the tendency of Western policymakers to approach
conflict in terms of particular problems. Once these
problems are ostensibly resolved, Westerners assume that
normal relationships have been established. As a result,
the organization of resources for future conflicts is
accorded lower priority or neglected. Western policy-
makers operate without a consensually accepted theory of
general or long-range conflict; this contrasts with the
Soviet approach, which integrates the short-run resolution
of problems into a broader view of long-range continuing
conflict [Ref . 95]
The above quote also contains an example of the differing
views of time between the two nations.
We have characterized Americans as living in the present.
The lack of a strict ideology to show them what the future
should be, and a similar lack of an ideological sense of
history seems to lead them to believe that the present is
more important in their world view. Americans see man as,
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"....inventive, shrewd, and practical on a short run basis,
and helpless, naive and unrealistic on a long range basis....
These traits resulted from the American's preoccupation with
short range and manageable problems." [Ref. 96]
Since they tend to live in the present and have a record
of success, Americans do not appear to have developed patience
as a cultural trait to the extent that the Russians have.
Problems are broken down, simplified, formulas applied, and
solutions are usually forthcoming. There appears to be little
need to wait for solutions as other problems are awaiting
attention. Priority is given to what is urgent, often at the
expense of what is important. It would seem quite easy for
the Soviets to outlast the Americans at the negotiating table--
Americans demand results, now, and appear willing to trade
concessions for these results.
Time in negotiations becomes important due to the
relatively frequent shifts in policy brought on by the
American elections. In the INF case, negotiations were
delayed for over a year to allow the Reagan administration
time to formulate its policy. Now, with only slightly over
a year left until the next elections one might expect a
flurry of activity at the negotiations in order for the
administration to reap some political gains from them. The
Soviets, on the other hand, appear to know that the best time
for them to gain advantages will be during this period when
the Americans will be driving for an agreement.
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The American view of time can be seen as leading to the
final trait to be discussed here, that of a desire to maintain
the status quo. We have said that there is no ubiquitous
ideology which determines to shape of the future for Americans,
no relentless march to Utopia. American Utopia appears to be
a situation where American principles can operate:
"....a world of plenty, of great expansion, of room
for everybody to make a contribution and succeed....
a
world in which every human being has a right to develop
what he has in him-a right to succeed, a right to the
rewards of success." [Ref. 97]
This world is one in which stability is important.
Although true stability certainly does not presently exist,
the world as it is now is one where the United States can
play a dominant role. It is not perfect but may be perfectable
and thus should not be allowed to radically change.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN ELITE POLITICAL CULTURE
It is important to keep in mind that the previous discussion
of the American political culture was designed to supply
justification for the development of a model of that culture.
It needs to be stated again that the stereotype developed is
based on generalizations, not necessarily accurate in all
respects but presented to point out some significant cultural
traits which are to be used in the later analysis of the INF
positions.
With these qualifications in mind the cultural stereotype
of the American political elite follows. Of primary concern
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to an American leader will be the actuality or appearance of
morality. Just as the Soviet leader will be primarily con-
cerned with survival the American leader will be concerned
with the "goodness" or "rightness" of his position. This
does not mean that the American will abandon positions of
strength or national interest for the sake of morality, for
he is also rational and pragmatic. It does mean that he
believes he must be convinced of the goodness of his position
as he sees it. The American leader's idealism will tend to make
him believe that his position is best "for all mankind" and
because of that he will invoke moral force to back his
position.
Since the American leader can be seen as believing that
he has the corner on the morality market, conflicts in which
he is involved will tend to take on the character of good vs.
evil. Since morality is all important, the contest becomes
one of either-or. The American position is the best hope for
mankind and that principle must be protected. The principle
is the operant term here. History is full of examples where
the initial American position has been significantly modified,
but always with the profession that the principles were upheld.
The coining of the term "peace with honor" to cover the
collapse in Vietnam is but one example.
Because of his moralistic and idealistic bent the American
leader will probably have a more limited set of "means" than
his Soviet counterpart. This is not to say that Americans
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can't be tough or don't use all available means to accomplish
their goals. What it does say is that their utilization of
these devices has limits. The American people have proven,
either through the ballot or through Congress, that "extremism"
(as in the case of Barry Goldwater) or "immorality" (in the
case of Richard Nixon) are not considered as acceptable
behavior on the part of their leaders.
The American leader will profess to reach decisions in a
rational manner, and attempt to impress that particular brand
of rationality on those with whom he deals. He will most
probably see the world in legalistic terms, thinking by
analogy and putting his own actions as well as those of
others to the legal test. In his attempt to find solutions
to the problems of the day he will simplify them to the
smallest component which can be solved by mechanistic means.
This mechanistic and legalistic view of problem solving
will lead him to a belief that if only the entire world would
view things in the same manner our difficulties would be
eased. Since many problems are solved by skill-thinking, in
many cases by the application of predetermined formulas, this
leader has little patience with long term solutions-he wants
results now.
We have now seen some differences in cultural background
upon which the behavior of the American and Soviet political
elite may be based. In so doing general cultural stereotypes
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of the leaders of each nation have been developed. The next
chapter discusses the INF negotiating positions of each side
from a cultural standpoint.
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IV. CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF INF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS
In the introduction to this thesis two possible
utilizations for the cultural stereotypes which were to be
developed were discussed. First, it was argued that these
cultural models could be utilized as a method of analyzing
the negotiating positions of each side at the INF negotiations,
Secondly, the cultural models were to be applied in an attempt
to see if predictions of each side's reactions to the other's
proposals could be made.
This chapter will first generally evaluate both the Soviet
and American negotiating positions utilizing the cultural
models. Once this has been done the predictive capabilities
of the models will be tested. In order to accomplish this a
specific U.S. position, the "Zero Option" plan, will be
analyzed culturally. Following that the model will be used
to predict what the Soviet reaction to that specific proposal
might be. Finally, the actual Soviet position will be
analyzed to determine the efficacy of the model in predicting
it.
References will be made throughout the chapter to specific
weapons systems on both sides. Appendix A contains a dis-
cussion of the capabilities of all weapons referred to in




A. SOVIET INF NEGOTIATING POSITION
The initial Soviet negotiating position evolved between
1979 and 1981. It was originally proposed in a speech by
Secretary Brezhnev in October 1979, in which he said:
We are prepared to reduce the number of medium-range
nuclear weapons deployed in the western areas of the
Soviet Union in comparison with the present level....
but of course only if no additional medium-range
nuclear weapons are deployed in Western Europe. [Ref. 98]
This offer to reduce the total number of delivery vehicles
targeted on Europe said nothing about continuing to deploy
the modern, multi-warheaded SS-20 (see Appendix A for specific
weapon characteristics). The continued deployment of the
SS-20 would have at least maintained the number of warheads
available to the Soviet Union despite a reduction of delivery
vehicles. In return for reducing the delivery vehicles NATO
would not deploy any of the 5 72 new Pershing-II and GLCM
missile scheduled for deployment in late 19 83.
The thrust of this Soviet negotiating position seems to
be designed to preserve their capability for inflicting massive
destruction in Europe while denying NATO that same capability.
This is euphemistically called "protecting the legitimate
security interests of the USSR". It is a most obvious example
of the Soviet cultural obsession with security. If the Soviet
position were to be accepted it would retain its most modern




In June 19 80, Brezhnev further proposed that negotiations
be aimed at balancing the Soviet INF missiles (but not
bombers) against the not-yet-deployed U.S. missiles and the
existing U.S. aircraft and theater submarine based missiles.
[Ref. 99] In February 1981, he proposed essentially the same
position as before but stated it slightly differently. The
proposal consisted of: 1) a freeze on the number of INF
missiles on both sides; 2) a halt to the modernization of
existing INF missiles; and 3) a freeze on the number of U.S.
aircraft. [Ref. 100] It was at this time that the Soviets
began emphasizing their belief that there was "relative
parity" between the two sides. Although puzzling at first,
the Soviet insistence upon maintaining that a relative balance
is already in place by putting so much emphasis on the numbers
of delivery vehicles can be seen as a manifestation of the
Soviet trait of seeking a weak link in an argument and pursuing
it relentlessly.
In the 19 81 Soviet weapons count there were 9 86 NATO units,
of these 26 3 were British and French vehicles and 723 were
American "units". The inclusion of British and French "units"
in the Soviet negotiating position also became important at
this time:
Brezhnev told [the West German magazine] Der Spiegel that
the Soviets would not seek to include the 26 3 British and
French delivery vehicles in the Geneva negotiations with
the Americans. He added, however, that the Soviets would
insist that the NATO states measure Soviet security needs




This "yardstick" seems to indicate that the existence of
the British and French units, whatever their number (now it's
16 2) is the floor beneath which the Soviets would not go in
their bargaining with the Americans. It can be assumed that
included in that floor number, on the Soviet side, would be
their most modern weapons, the SS-20 and Backfire bomber.
[Ref. 102] The logic appears to be that the threat to Soviet
security comes from an integrated, unified NATO whose purpose
is the destruction of that security, so only the most capable
weapons would remain.
The inclusion of the British and French weapons in the
negotiations is a good example of the clash of the cultural
aspect on both sides. The Americans, in their legalistic
manner, say the British and French weapons are not under NATO
command and cannot be counted as NATO weapons. The Soviets
see the entire alliance as a threat and insist that all
weapons targeted against the USSR be counted, regardless of
the command structure or legalities involved.
By reducing the base number of delivery vehicles on both
sides to 263 the Soviets now suggested a "large reduction"
in their remaining 712 delivery vehicles and the U.S.'s 723.
This Soviet position was:
With a view to reducing the level of the aforementioned
weapons as much as possible for both NATO and the Soviet
Union, the agreement should provide for a reduction in
the present number of such weapons (approximately 1000
units on each side) to 300 units on each side by the end
of 1990, with the establishment of an intermediate level
of 600 units by the end of 1985 .... [Ref . 103]
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As was stated above these units on the Soviet side would
most probably consist of their most capable weapons while
the NATO forces would be less capable.
As an example, if both sides were to draw down to 300
INF units each, and the Soviet moratorium on the deployment
of new missiles was to be accepted, then (in 19 81 numbers)
the following force levels would occur:
If the British and French were to retain all 26 3 units
that Brezhnev judged unfit for negotiation, then the NATO
arsenal of 300 units would consist of 144 French units,
119 British units and 37 U.S. units. [Ref. 104]
This obvious imbalance would serve to assure the security
of the Soviet Union. It is important to note here that while
the U.S. might see this imbalance as a manifestation of a
Soviet drive for superiority, viewed from the Soviet cultural
perspective this imbalance might appear to be considered
necessary for the survival of the Soviet state, and as such
reasonable from their point of view.
The remaining 72 3 American units were now made up solely
of aircraft. It was also at this time that the Soviets
dropped from their position any discussion of submarine
launched missiles. This seemingly logical proposal was also
designed with their security in mind for as Christopher Jones
points out:
Brezhnev specifically sought to relocate NATO's Poseidon
missiles in the central U.S. arsenal. He proposed that
the United States and the Soviet Union should "agree
that the missile submarines of the two sides should be
removed from their present extensive patrol areas and
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that their cruises should be restricted to limits
mutually agreed upon". This would bar Poseidon sub-
marines from "European" waters. [Ref. 105]
While the Poseidon possesses a relatively long range missile
its removal from European waters would probably decrease its
targeting flexibility, and presumably relieve some Soviet
targets of the threat of the SLBM launch. Again this
proposal is based in the Soviet obsession for security.
The current Soviet position is that talks should deal
with all medium-range nuclear forces in Europe, including
the French and British national nuclear forces, and all air-
craft. In response to President Reagan's "Zero Option" plan
(about which more will be said later) the Soviets proposed a
reduction of their SS-20's to the British and French total of
162 missiles, and an equal limit on delivery aircraft. In
early May, 19 83, the Soviets proposed to reduce their medium-
range forces in Europe to present NATO levels in numbers of
warheads as well as in numbers of delivery vehicles.
There are several other cultural points that can be made
which bear on the general design of the Soviet negotiating
position mentioned above. The first is that the Soviets
maintain a strict monopoly on the Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons
in the European theater. Secondly, it appears important that
nuclear weapons in Europe be coupled to the use of the U.S.
strategic arsenal. Finally, the Soviet view of war in Europe
and its concern with the lowering of the nuclear threshold
shows a cultural influence.
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All Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons are under the direct
control of the Soviet Union and it also possesses all of the
long range delivery systems. This absolute control evidences
a distrust of its allies that seems deeply cultural in nature.
Even the threat the Soviet Union faces by basing these
weapons on its soil does not appear to be enough to force it
to relinquish this control. It is also important to note
that basing these weapons in the Soviet Union raises the
price for the U.S. to attack it by nuclear means. This leads
to the importance of coupling European nuclear use to the U.S.
strategic arsenal.
The Soviets appear to be genuinely concerned with the
fact that the deployment of the NATO nuclear missiles would
lower the nuclear threshold. A commentary in PRAVDA by N.
Fyodorov explains this position:
....cruise missiles are a major factor increasing the
threat that a nuclear war will break out.... their use
. . .
.would lead to the obliteration of the distinctions
between strategic and tactical weapons and would
facilitate a lowering of the "nuclear threshold" and
an increase in the risk of nuclear conflict. [Ref. 106]
While it is important to them that this nuclear threshold
not be lowered, it would appear to be more important that any
nuclear conflict which could damage the Soviet Union also
include a direct threat to the survival of the United States.
Not only is there a greater deterrent value of this coupling
between a European nuclear war and the fate of the United
States, but also it can be seen as part of the Soviet cultural
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paranoia that it has always suffered great losses in war.
The idea that it could suffer nuclear damage while the
American continent would remain untouched is abhorrent to
the Soviet leadership.
The stated Soviet position if the NATO missiles are
actually deployed is important. Christopher Jones shows that
its reaction would be to recouple the nuclear threat to the
U.S. mainland:
The Soviets have frequently warned that they will
respond to the deployment of the 5 72 U.S. missiles
in Europe with the deployment of additional SS-20
missiles. In March of 19 82 they added a further
warning that they would also respond by deploying new
Soviet missiles aimed at targets on U.S. territory....
[The official Soviet position is]:
If the Governments of the United States and its NATO
allies, in defiance of the will of nations for peace,
were to carry out their plan to deploy in Europe
hundreds of new American missiles capable of striking
targets on the territory of the Soviet Union, a
different strategic situation would arise in the world.
There would arise a real additional threat to our
country and its allies from the United States.
This would compel us to take retaliatory steps that
would put the other side, including the United States
itself, its own territory in analogous position.
This should not be forgotten. [Ref. 107]
It is generally regarded to be a constant theme of Soviet
rhetoric that it bore the brunt of the suffering in World War
II. The Soviets are particularly bitter towards the Americans
who, they feel, waited until the Russians wore out the Germans
before they opened the second front and reaped the benefits
of victory. Devastation of the Soviet nation again, without




Finally, the Soviet view of nuclear war, especially a
war in Europe contrasts with the U.S. view. These positions
can also be seen as culturally based. An outgrowth of the
ideological view of the correlation of forces is the virtual
requirement that the Soviets seize the initiative when the
conditions are right to do so. In addition, this seizing of
the initiative quite probably includes a massing of force
which would lead to a quick, decisive victory. These
conditions appear to lead them to a prediliction to preempt.
This doctrinal preference for preemption would quite
possibly lead to the early introduction of nuclear weapons
into a European conflict. Nuclear war, in the Soviet cultural
view, would introduce a chaos so strong that it probably
could not be controlled. This is recognized by American
planners
:
The Soviets believe that any tactical use of nuclear
weapons, even limited, would be difficult to control,
and rapid escalation-even theater-wide-is highly likely.
[Ref. 108]
In the cultural view this lack of control could lead to the
destruction of the state. This must not be allowed to occur.
It would seem that the primary method of control which could
be envisioned would be if the Soviets would dominate the
utilization of these nuclear weapons.
This domination would probably take the form of early
and massive utilization to ensure victory because:
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....nuclear war cannot— indeed, must not-be deprived of
strategic meaning, that is some rational relationship to
the interests of the state. ... [it] must be something that
the state can survive and some kind of meaningful victory
is possible. [Ref. 109]
This early and massive use of nuclear weapons would most
probably be to deny NATO any significant use of nuclear
weapons, so that the survival of the Soviet state would be
assured.
The early use of nuclear weapons would most probably be
part of an integrated strike which would serve to ensure that
the ground forces would "seize and occupy" [Ref. 110] the
territory made available by the massive use of nuclear
weapons. This is part of the long-established Soviet inte-
grated military doctrine which can be traced to their
cultural view of events as being integrated and interrelated.
To review, we have seen the following cultural points in
the Soviet INF position: the obsession with security; the
interrelatedness of the threat; the paranoia about the
suffering of the Soviet state throughout history; the fear
of chaos; and the ideological points of the correlation of
forces, seeking the weakest link, and the integration of
doctrine. The American negotiating position will now be
analyzed.
B. U.S. INF NEGOTIATING POSITION
The current American position is a modification of the
Zero Option plan (Reagan's Zero Option plan will be discussed
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in more detail below) . This plan would forgo deployment
of the Pershing-II and GLCM missiles in exchange for the
dismantling of all Soviet missiles. The Zero option plan
appears designed to eliminate the Soviet capability to
inflict massive nuclear destruction in Europe through the
use of missiles. It is a model of the cultural trait of
simplicity, trading those U.S. missiles not yet deployed for
the destruction of all Soviet intermediate range missiles
worldwide.
Presumably, the elimination of all INF missiles from
Europe would place the two sides in a more even position,
having to rely almost exclusively on aircraft as nuclear
delivery vehicles in the European theater. It seems obvious
that the mobility and multiple-warhead capability of the SS-20
is perceived as a significant threat which must be matched or
eliminated.
The American position did not include aircraft as being
negotiable in order to simplify the negotiations. [Ref. Ill]
This is an example of the American cultural tendency to
simplify and compartmentalize problems.
In March of 19 8 3 President Reagan proposed an interim
agreement, by which the U.S. would substantially reduce its
planned deployment of the new missiles for a corresponding
Soviet reduction in medium-range warheads on a global basis.
The American's side was undoubtedly becoming impatient with
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the pace of the negotiations, reflecting, perhaps, the
American view of time, an inner clock with a deadline.
The American emphasis on reducing warheads worldwide
appears to come from the fact that the U.S. and Soviets also
disagree over whether to count the Soviet SS-20 units deployed
in Asia. The U.S. wants to count these because they are
mobile and could easily target Europe. The Soviets say leave
them out, because they are deployed to protect their eastern
flank from an integrated threat and should not be included
in discussions of reductions in Europe. The American position
in this case may be seen as an emphasis on a strictly legal
interpretation of the situation.
Further cultural points dealing with the NATO policy of
flexible response, the American view of decoupling, and the
American drive for stability are germain. While not
specifically part of the negotiating position these points
are important because they affect that position and show
interesting cultural influences.
The American and NATO policy of flexible response exhibits
a certain cultural perspective. The primary emphasis of
flexible response seems to be a good example of skill-thinking,
that escalation of the conflict would occur in distinct,
rationally related steps. Additionally, American deterrence
theory seems to place a premium on stability, another point
with an important cultural background.
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The thrust of flexible response as both a deterrent and
a warfighting policy rests on the existence of discrete steps
in the escalatory process which would provide for a method
of controlling that escalation at each step. This graduated
escalation method is thought to enhance deterrence by,
"....raising the possibility that aggression at any one level
of conflict might either be matched in kind or escalated.
"
[Ref. 112] As a warfighting technique, "the range of options
resulting from conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic
forces provides some possibility of controlling escalation
and stopping conflict at the lowest level possible...."
[Ref. 113]
Flexible response can be seen as an example of skill-
thinking. The purpose of controlled escalation is to:
....dramatically change the ....assessment of the WP
[Warsaw Pact] political leaders regarding early or cheap
victory, and create a situation conducive to negotiations
in which NATO has some tactical advantages. To accomplish
the above while trying to avoid escalation to general
nuclear war .... efforts would be made to control escalation
in such desperate circumstances by a combination of
clearly perceivable limits on the NATO nuclear response
and the threat of more extensive strikes with theater and
strategic forces if the WP chooses to escalate. [Ref. 114]
Presumably, at each discrete step in the escalatory ladder
decision-makers would be given the time and information to
determine rationally whether to proceed to the next step.
This compartmentalization of nuclear war requires almost
perfect perceptions of the other side's intentions and a
belief that each step will be properly interpreted by the
Soviet leaders, a primary example of skill thinking.
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As previously stated the Soviet leaders show a preference
in their strategic doctrine for early and massive use of
nuclear weapons. That they would modify their culturally
determined actions in response to limits which might not be
as "clearly perceivable" to them as to the Americans, is
optimistic to say the least.
Another cultural point is about decoupling. Flexible
response provides a range of options which U.S. planners see
as distinct steps on an escalatory ladder. The deployment
of the Pershing-II and GLCM missiles would provide some very
capable nuclear options to the U.S. planners at a level below
strategic nuclear war. This decouples these nuclear options
from an all out U.S. -Soviet nuclear exchange. In the American
view this would seem to be rational and pragmatic, both
cultural influences.
To the Americans the deployment of the missiles in NATO's
modernization track:
....could lessen any Soviet doubts about the U.S. stra-
tegic guarantee to NATO and help to alleviate concerns
on the part of the Allies regarding Soviet force
modernization by closing real or perceived gaps in the
escalatory ladder. INF deployments by NATO are planned
to be of a size and character so as to preclude the
perception of decoupling, while at the same time serving
to deter a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe.
[Ref. 115]
This may be seen as universalism at work. The Americans
expect the Soviets to see their deployment of the missiles
in the same light as they do. The fact that the Soviets
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might see these actions as coming from a more sinister set
of intentions appears to be lost on the American policy
makers because of. this universalism.
On a military level these missiles would; 1) allow the
capability to target previously untargeted "hard" targets in
the Soviet Union; 2) permit the use of lower yield warheads
(because of increased accuracy) thereby reducing collateral
damage; 3) increase the weapons-system survivability over
the current situation by reducing the reliance on manned air-
craft; and 4) free some dual-capable aircraft for conventional
roles. [Ref. 116] This again seems to be a rational decision
for the Americans to make in order to correct the imbalance
of Soviet missiles in Europe. The Soviets appear to be
expected to accept this brand of rationality.
Stability is important to American deterrence theory. In
the American view the lack of a NATO deterrent which matches
the SS-20 is destabilizing; it invites the Soviets to take
advantage of a weakness in NATO. Stability would be enhanced,
in the American view, by the deployment of the weapons which
would serve as a match for the Soviet capability.
The official U.S. position regarding the GLCM seems to
require the Soviets to "mirror image" the American view of
stability and the new missiles' place in it:
The relatively slow flight of current generation cruise
missiles should not represent an increased first-strike
threat to the Soviet Union. Rather, cruise missile
deployments symbolize a second-strike capability which
should have a stabilizing effect. [Ref. 117]
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The Soviet reaction to the deployment of the cruise
missiles seems to show a belief that they will have the
opposite effect and be destabilizing in the extreme:
The U.S.'s unilateral actions with respect to the deploy-
ment of cruise missiles cannot be regarded as anything
but an attempt at any cost to upset the military-
strategic equilibrium in its favor. [Ref. 118]
Thus the belief that the deployment of these missiles would
lead to a lessening of tensions appears to have a totally
opposite effect on the leaders of the other side. Assuming
that both sides are sincere, it becomes obvious that their
perceptions rest on a different base, a base strongly colored
by their political culture.
We have seen the cultural traits of pragmatism, skill
thinking, legalism, and simplicity in the preceeding discussion
of the American INF position. In addition to the general
positions and doctrinal discussions mentioned above the
importance of the cultural influence will now be shown on the
specific negotiating positions of each side. It is here where
some predictive capabilities of the cultural models developed
earlier in this thesis will be displayed.
C. ZERO OPTION
The Zero Option proposal was presented by President Reagan
during a speech to the National Press Club on November 18,
1981, just prior to the November 30 start date for the
negotiations (the entire speech is included as Appendix B to
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this thesis) . It is important to note that the speech was
beamed via satellite to Europe, with a worldwide audience of
about 200 million. [Ref. 119] This is not the only attempt
to court the opinion of the Europeans, a practice apparently
considered essential by both sides. The speech appears to
have been designed to have an impact on world opinion, and
to persuade our European allies of the morality and necessity
of the American position.
The American cultural model of moralism, legalism, a
penchant for simple and short term solutions, the universalism
of U.S. views and the desire to maintain the status quo are
reflected in the speech.
President Reagan's speech is righteous in tone and
sprinkled liberally with moralisms. He begins by reading a
letter he sent to Secretary Brezhnev which, he says, sets
the tone for the American negotiating position to follow:
....the peoples of the world, despite differences in
racial and ethnic origin, have very much in common.
They want the dignity of having some control over their
individual lives, their destiny. They want to work at
the craft or trade of their own choosing and to be
fairly rewarded. They want to raise their families in
peace without harming anyone or suffering harm themselves.
Government exists for their convenience, not the other
way around. [Ref. 120]
This emphasis on the individual and the role of government
reflects the American cultural view of man, one we have
described as being quite different from the Soviet.
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After emphasizing (and universalizing) this American
view of the world he goes on to claim the rights to the
virtuous position. He says that the United States had the
power to dominate the world after World War II but:
....The United States followed a different course, one
unique in all the history of mankind. We used our
power and wealth to rebuild the war-ravished economies
of the world, including those of the nations who had
been our enemies. [Ref. 121]
He follows this with the claim that: "....twice in my
lifetime, young Americans have bled their lives into the soil
of ....battlefields not to enrich or enlarge our domain, but
to restore the peace and independence of our friends and
allies." [Ref. 122] In these quotes that special "missionary"
tone that identifies its moralistic base is apparent.
In the speech several times the President displayed the
penchant of Americans to simplify:
"There is a tendency to make this entire subject overly
complex... I want to be clear and concise ... It ' s [the
American proposal] a simple, straightforward, yet historic
message." [Ref. 123]
He continues by breaking deterrence theory into two simple
sentences:
Deterring war depends upon the perceived ability of our
forces to perform effectively. The more effective our
forces are the less likely it is that we'll have to use
them. [Ref. 124]
There does not appear to be, however, an obvious under-
lying tone of legalism in this speech. Even the reference
to verification, usually the prime example of American legalism
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in arms control negotiations, is general in nature. "Our
approach to verification will be to emphasize openness and
creativity rather than secrecy and suspicion..." [Ref. 125]
Although that seems to claim the high ground again, indirectly
blaming the Soviets for previous "secrecy and suspicion", it
could also be read as a softening of the normal American
strictly legalistic approach to verification.
Examples of the American desire to maintain the status
quo are also present in the speech.
Our policies have resulted in the longest European peace
in this century. Wouldn't a rash departure from these
policies, as some now suggest, endanger the peace?....
These. ... elements of our policy have preserved the peace
in Europe for more than a third of a century. They can
preserve it for generations to come, so long as we
pursue them with sufficient will and vigor. [Ref. 126]
We also see universalism here. The claim seems to be that
the longest European peace of this century is a direct result
of the American approach exclusively.
There are several other instances of the habit of
universalizing American ideals.
And terms like "peace" and "security", we have to say
have little meaning for the oppressed and the destitute.
They also mean little to the individual whose state has
stripped him of human freedom and dignity. Wherever
there is oppression, we must strive for the peace and
security of individuals as well as states. We must
recognize that progress and the pursuit of liberty is a
necessary complement to military security. [Ref. 127]
This appeal to the basic morality of American, ideals shows a




The final American cultural trait, the desire for a
quick fix is not obvious in the speech, although it might be
conjectured that as the 1984 elections get closer there will
be more movement on the American side.
It appears from the above analysis that there was a
cultural basis to President Reagan's Zero Option speech, and
thus to the American position at the negotiations. It is
also important to note that not only do the positions appear
culturally based but the rhetoric is designed to appeal to
the American public, by emphasizing those points which might
be termed culturally attractive.
But what of the Soviets? It is a thesis of this study
that the knowledge of the Soviet political culture might
make one able to predict, in general, reactions to a speech
such as President Reagan's. Before we discuss the Soviet
reaction to the speech such a prediction will be made.
D. SOVIET REACTION TO ZERO OPTION
To review, the model of the Soviet political stereotype
is based on the idea of constant struggle, that man is evil
and can't be trusted, on the emphasis on control, on secrecy
and deception, on collective decision-making and is permeated
with a cultural paranoia that includes all these factors.
A prediction of Soviet reactions based upon the above
model yields the following points:
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1. The cultural paranoia of the Soviet government
would probably lead it to suspect a trick, to
accuse the Reagan administration of trying to
gain superiority while claiming the existence of
parity right now, since it deals in secrecy and
and deception it might expect the American program
to be a lie, to cover a move to gain absolute
control
;
2. The Soviets would object to, but might not comment
upon the moralism and universalism in the President's
rhetoric
;
3. The Soviet negotiating position would probably
stress the interrelatedness of all the types of
weapons involved, and would be designed so that
control of the strategic situation in Europe
would remain in Soviet hands;
4. The Soviet negotiating position would quite probably
be designed to ensure protracted negotiations in
the hope that the Americans might lose patience;
5. The Soviets would most likely reject the Zero
Option proposal out of hand, claiming it would
interfere with their security and attacking it at
its weakest link.
The actual Soviet reaction to the Zero Option proposal contains,
in one form or another, each of the points postulated by the
model, as will be discussed below.
Soviet press and commentator reaction to the Zero Option
speech was immediate and negative. TASS called the proposals:
"...a ploy to scuttle the disarmament talks...." and President
Reagan's figures "absolutely fantastic" [Ref. 128] in an
immediate dispatch from Washington. This is an excellent
example of point 1 above.
It is interesting to note that, in response to a later
Reagan proposal for an interim agreement calling for a
reduction in the numbers of missiles, Soviet Foreign Minister
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Gromyko called a news conference which was broadcast inter-
nationally. Apparently, the propaganda war, particularly
that directed at Western European public opinion, is
particularly important to this situation. This is no small
point, and while not treated directly in this thesis, is an
important tactic in superpower competition.
In the months between this immediate reaction and the
official Soviet reaction and outline of the new proposals in
TASS in February 1982, (this reaction is included in its
entirety as Appendix C) news reports and commentaries were
full of the "line" which included the following items: 1)
the zero option requires that the Soviets unilaterally disarm
and leave their European sector defenseless, an example of
cultural paranoia; 2) the USSR has 9 75 delivery vehicles
subject to INF negotiations, the U.S. has 9 86, a rough parity;
3) the French and British missiles must be counted as all
NATO threats in Europe are interrelated; and 4) the U.S. is
seeking to destroy the principle of equality and equal security
upon which all agreements should be based. [Ref. 129]
Not bashful about assuming the cloak of morality for
itself, the Soviet reaction in the TASS commentary claims
that:
Consistently guided by the interests of strengthening the
peace and reducing the threat of war, the Soviet Union has
consistently advocated and advocates ... agreeing on concrete
and effective measures designed to limit and to reduce the
medium-range nuclear armaments in. ... Europe ... .As a result
of the purposeful and principled line of the Soviet side,
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it has proved possible to bring about the commencement
of the negotiations with the USA. [Ref. 130]
A primary theme running through the reaction is that
Reagan's proposal is an attempt to gain superiority for the
Americans in the European theater. Again, cultural paranoia
undoubtedly plays a part in this. This was officially stated
as: "What is being tried at present is no more and no less
than to obtain from the USSR a unilateral disarmament in the
face of a military threat....". [Ref. 131] Another inter-
esting bit of paranoia in the TASS reaction is this:
"Washington's genuine design. ... lies in creating. ... a logjam
at the negotiations, to block them and then to try to lay
blame for this at the Soviet Union's door." [Ref. 132] This
may also be seen as an example of the Soviet's "mirror imaging"
their behavior on the Americans.
A final example of paranoia occurs when TASS sees a
Pentagon plot seeking "....the creation of a first strike
capability against the USSR...." [Ref. 133]. These comments
seem to go beyond mere rhetoric and show a true Soviet fear
that it will lose its superiority, and thus its security
would be endangered.
There are several examples of point 3, the Soviet pro-
clivity to see all things as complex and interrelated, and as




But one may ask, why should the Soviet Union sacrifice
the interests of its security for an imaginary "simplicity"
of the solution which appears to be so pleasing to
Washington? Can the Soviet Union in its assessment of
the military-strategic situation in Europe ignore more
than seven-hundred American aircraft carrying nuclear
weapons posing a threat to it and its allies. And can
it throw out of consideration more than two and a half
hundred British and French missiles and aircraft carrying
nuclear weapons? [Ref. 134]
Finally, a consistent theme in the TASS reaction is that
the U.S. is trying to undermine the principle of equality
and equal security upon which all negotiations are based.
Aside from showing the Soviet obsession with security this
theme points to its reluctance to give up even the appearance
of its hard earned parity, another staple of Soviet rhetoric
concerning the arms-control situation.
This appears to be an important point to the Soviets,
their acceptance as a super-power confers certain rights upon
them and enhances their position in the world. Given the
basic paranoia resident in the Soviet personality they should
be expected to guard this position jealously.
The TASS article also sets out the Soviet negotiating
position. Much of this position was discussed above but will
be briefly repeated because it is germane to the analysis of
the predictive capabilities of the model. There are four
major points in the position and each will be considered from
a cultural viewpoint.
Point 1 - "In keeping with the principle of equality and
equal security, the agreement must cover... all medium-
range nuclear weapons...." These points were discussed
above and show Soviet paranoia and the principles of
interrelatedness . [Ref. 135]
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Point 2 - There should be a draw down of weapons to 30
delivery vehicles on each side by 1990, with an interim
goal of 600 by 19 85. Each side would get to choose
which weapons would be allowed to remain in place.
Point 3 - While the negotiations are in progress there
should be a moratorium on the deployment of new weapons.
Both of these points, if accepted at face value, would
serve to ensure Soviet superiority throughout the period
of the agreement. Again, the Soviet position appears to
be designed so that there can be no "window of vulnera-
bility" to their security. Although an argument can be
made that these are negotiating positions designed to be
modified, the principle of absolute security appears so
deeply ingrained in their culture that no significant
movement in this area should be expected.
Point 4 - This is another example of not giving up an
item of basic security. It states that while most
weapons will be destroyed, each side reserves the right
to relocate some weapons behind agreed lines. Again,
this seems to be an attempt to maintain the advantage
by utilizing the mobility of the SS-20 to their advantage.
The Soviets would presumably scrap the obsolescent SS-4's
and SS-5's while maintaining the SS-20, allowing their
quick redeployment if necessary.
The Soviet reaction to the Reagan proposal and their own
proposal are influenced, of course, by their political culture.
How does this actual reaction fit the reaction predicted above?
There were five basic points of prediction from the model
(see above p. 94): 1) the Soviets would suspect a trick by
the U.S. to allow us to gain superiority in the region; 2) they
would object to President Reagan's moralism and universalism;
3) they would stress the interrelatedness of the threat to
their security; 4) they would design their position to ensure
protracted negotiations and; 5) they would reject the proposal




Each point of the prediction has been illustrated to some
degree, although points four and five are less obvious than
the others. The predictive capability of the model appears
to have validity. However, as will be stressed in the
conclusion, it is important not to overemphasize the results
of the model here. Cultural precepts form the framework





The purpose of this thesis was to construct a model,
based on the elite political culture of both the U.S. and
the USSR, which could be used to interpret and predict the
behavior of the leaders of those nations. Such a model was
developed utilizing the different environment and historical
frameworks of each nation as a base. The model was applied
to some general situations and policies and then to a
specific negotiating position of each side, the American Zero
Option and the Soviet reaction to it. It appears that it was
relatively successful in its explanation function and
moderately successful when used as a predictor.
Its use should not be overemphasized. Because these
stereotypes are general in nature it becomes relatively easy
to fit each government's behavior to them. As was stated in
the introduction to this thesis the adversarial relationship
between the two powers results from many causes spread over
the broad continuum of their mutual relations. To see
political culture as the proximate cause of the difficulties
between the two nations not only overstates its case, but
misunderstands its impact.
It is important to remember that Edward T. Hall's
definition of the "covert culture" is that it must be
experienced on the subconscious, emotional level rather than
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on the rational level. [Ref. 136] To point to political
culture as the direct cause of a position or statement takes
it from the subconscious and places it on the rational level,
in direct contradiction to its definition. How, then, can
we assess its impact?
One might turn to Hall for assistance. In the introduction
to his new book The Dance of Life , he specifies how what he
calls "primary level culture" (which is analagous to his
"covert culture" described above) operates:
Primary level culture has core components which pattern
our thinking and which give us sets of underlying
assumptions for arriving at the "truth". [Ref. 137]
The definition of political culture utilized in this
thesis allows it to be used as an example of Hall's "primary
level culture". It is defined here as the framework within
which conceptual politics operates. Could it be that the
political cultures discussed here have formed the framework
in which each nation sees the truth? This would allow
explanation of such diverse positions as are evident in the
INF negotiations, and yield the obvious conclusion that each
state believes in the truth of its own position.
This may be the key to the operation of political culture
on a government's behavior. If so, we might modify the
definition here to say that political culture is the framework
that gives the leaders of each government their view of the
truth. How they behave once they have arrived at this truth
may vary according to the specifics of the situation or the
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personality of the leader, but the base from which they
operate can be seen as culturally determined.
Political culture cannot be claimed as the immediate
cause of the behavior of governments. That behavior is not
played out as if it came from some culturally determined
script. Behavior along these lines would seem to ultimately
lead to an unstopable conflagration because of the differences
between the cultures. George Liska shares this ominous view
of the power of cultural conflict:
When alienation rules between cultures, alliances of
state either become impossible or are indicted by
purists as treasonable; politics tends towards fanaticism
rather than pragmatism; erosion of ideology is replaced
with explosions of idiosyncracies . [Ref. 138]
There is an apparent finality to this pessimistic view of
the conflict of cultures, an inexorable march to cataclysm
And while Soviet-American relations have shown touches of
"fanaticism" through the years with the short periods of good
relations being indicted as treasonable in some quarters,
there have been some successes and cataclysm has been avoided.
So, as pervasive as the cultural influence is, it is but one
of a number of causes of governmental, causes which operates
concurrently in a complex web of action.
What, then is the value of understanding the cultural
basis for a government's behavior? One idea may be that if
the leadership can understand the cultural influence in both
its own and its adversary's behavior it might be able to
temper that behavior in such a way as to reduce its impact
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on the other culture. In this thesis we have identified
cultural influence in the stated positions of governments.
We have also said that governmental behavior is not directly
caused by culture alone, but by a variety of influences each
more or less important as the situation dictates. Is it
then possible to segregate those positions or statements
which have a significant cultural influence from those which
are less so?
If political culture is the subconscious framer of
attitudes, of one's view of the truth, then we might expect
those positions with the strongest cultural influence to be
those which will be the most important to the leaders involved,
If those positions can be segregated from the rest then it
might be possible to deal with them as such. It might be
appropriate here to re-state Hall's discussion of the
importance of transcending culture cited in the beginning of
this thesis:
....if man is not to destroy himself he must begin to
transcend his own culture. First, the overt, obvious
culture-which it is possible to bridge with patience and
good will-but the second and more important, unconscious
culture-which it is more difficult to transcend. [Ref.
139]
Adam Ulam, in his Expansion and Coexistence poses a series
of "what-if" questions which might have changed the history
between the two nations
:
What if Stalin's Russia had been more trusting and chose
to abide by the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe
which pledged the Big Three to abide by the free verdict
of the nations liberated from the Nazi yoke? What,
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conversly, might have happened had Truman's America been
capable of enough realpolitik to concede Eastern Europe
to Stalin as his sphere of influence and curb its
indignation about free elections not being allowed in
Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia. ... etc. ? What....
if Stalin's fears had been less extravagant, America's
moralistic passion more restrained? [Ref. 140]
The "what-ifs" discussed by Ulam appear to fit the
category of positions with strong cultural influence. In
order for any of them to occur each government would have had
to transcend its culture in some extraordinary way. That it
did not occur is not surprising because, as Hall has said,
the unconscious culture is extremely difficult to transcend.
Based on the foregoing it would seem that the positions
which had the most direct cultural influence would be
identified as the most important to the governments involved.
If this is true then modification of those positions by a
government could be termed a significant indication. But an
indication of what?
One would hardly expect the Soviets to yield on a question
which deals with their core security any more than the
Americans would yield on a point which would make them appear
to act in conflict with their ideals. But if movement on a
position identified as strongly related to the core security
of the Soviet Union, for example, was noted it could indicate
that a significant event had occurred. What that event was
could be as diverse as a breakthrough in weapons technology
which makes the previous weapon obsolete, and thus negotiable,
to the long anticipated, but never seen, indication that the
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Arms Race has finally become too much of a burden on the
Soviet economy, and thus in some small way negotiable.
In this general postulation of extremes it is not
important what the event is. What is important is that the
signal that a significant event might have occurred came from
movement on a point which might be termed as being deeply
culturally influenced.
Maybe this is the value of the understanding of the
different political cultures, not as a method to explain or
even predict behavior but as an evaluator of the relative
importance of a position or policy. To be more specific, in
the INF case, were the Soviets to drop their insistence that
the British and French weapons be counted as part of the
negotiations, it would seem to be a signal that they were
ready to move, for whatever reason, on a point which is
culturally related.
By the same token, were the Americans to accept this
modification as a significant one and modify their position
in response, it could also be seen as significant because of
the strong cultural influence evident in the American position.
It is a basic point with the Americans that the Soviet position
on the British and French weapons is unacceptable from a legal
standpoint, a position with strong cultural overtones. If the
extent of cultural influence in these positions was realized
on each side, and its significance appreciated, an opportunity
to negotiate on a previously non-negotiable topic might exist.
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While all this is admittedly conjecture, it points to
the possible utility of an understanding of both one's own
and the adversary's political culture.
This thesis has shown that there appears to be utility
in the understanding of the influence of political culture
on governmental behavior. This utility comes in three basic
areas. First, an understanding of political culture can be
useful in explaining a position or statement by one side.
Secondly, given that position or statement, a knowledge of
political culture might aid in the prediction of the reaction
of the other side to the position. Finally, a knowledge of
political culture may assist in determining the relative
importance of different negotiating points to the governments
involved.




APPENDIX A: INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE NEGOTIATIONS
The bi-lateral INF negotiations have been in progress
since 1981. Although this appendix will not discuss these
negotiations in detail, it is essential to the understanding
of the situation that a brief history of the talks and an
explanation of the substantive positions of each side be
attempted. This appendix will discuss the progress of the
talks and describe and account for the weapons involved.
On December 12, 19 79 the NATO Defense and Foreign
Ministers issued a communique which set up a "dual-track"
approach to the solution of what was considered to be a
serious problem, loss of credibility for the NATO nuclear
deterrent. The first, or "modernization track" proposed the
deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles in West Germany and
464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) in five countries
(West Germany, Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, and Italy)
.
This deployment was to commence in late 19 8 3 and continue
through 1988. The purpose of the time delay for the initial
deployment was two-fold; 1) to allow for development time for
the Pershing II missile and; 2) to allow negotiations with the
Soviets along the "arms-control track".
The aim of the arms control-track was to "....achieve a
balance between Soviet missiles already deployed and the U.S.
missiles not yet deployed." [Ref. 141] Preliminary dis-
cussions began a few weeks before the 1980 U.S. presidential
elections but were suspended when the new president was
elected.
19 81 was a year of long range preliminaries between the
two powers until the formal negotiations began in November.
The talks have proceeded on-and-off during the intervening
time with little progress, despite some highly publicized,
but not particularly significant, position modifications
emanating from both sides.
As might be expected there is considerable disagreement
between the positions of the two countries. At the most basic
level there is disagreement about what is even to be negotiated
The term Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force is of U.S. origin
and refers to:
Nuclear systems below intercontinental range but above the
range of system designed for use on, or in direct support
of, the battlefield/ [Ref. 142]
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In the missile category, anything with a range of over 1000
KM is considered to be subject to negotiation. In addition,
the U.S. position deals solely with missiles (SS-4,5, and 20,
P-II and GLCM) as the "....systems of most concern to both
sides." [Ref. 143] The Soviet position includes both missiles
and nuclear capable delivery aircraft located in the European
theater. For background both missiles and aircraft will be
discussed here.
A. SOVIET INF CAPABILITIES
There are three types of Soviet missiles involved in the
negotiations. The first is the SS-4, a liquid fueled rocket
fired from stationary launch pads which was first deployed
in 1959. [Ref. 144] It has a maximum range of about 1200 nm
and can deliver its single, 1 megaton warhead with an accuracy
of about 1 nm. In 1961 the Soviets deployed the second of
the three missiles, the SS-5. It is also liquid fueled and
fired from fixed pads. Its maximum range is about 2300 nm,
and it also delivers a one megaton warhead to an accuracy of
about a mile. [Ref. 145]
In 19 77 the Soviets began replacing the SS-4 and SS-5
missiles with the much more capable SS-20. The SS-20 is a
solid fueled rocket fired from mobile launchers. It delivers
three separately targeted 150 kiloton warheads to a range of
about 2700 nm with an accuracy of less than a quarter of a
mile. Its increased accuracy and mobility are a significant
improvement over the older missiles and pose a significant
nuclear threat to NATO forces throughout Europe. [Ref. 146]
In addition to the missiles the Soviets have three types
of bombers capable of nuclear weapons delivery within the
range limits significant to these negotiations. The Badger
can carry two nuclear devices to a range of about 150 nm.
The Blinder also carries two devices and has a range of 1700
nm. Finally, in 19 74 the Soviets began to deploy the Backfire,
which can carry four devices over 2100 nm. [Ref. 14 7]
B. NATO INF CAPABILITIES
NATO currently has no missiles deployed with a range in
excess of 1000 KM. The two U.S. missiles to be deployed in
late 1983 as part of the modernization-track will, however,
have that capability. The Pershing II missiles carries a
single 10-20 kiloton warhead over 1100 nm. [Ref. 148] It is
a mobile, solid fueled rocket which represents a significant
improvement over the existing Pershing la in the areas of
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mobility, command and control, range, accuracy and surviva-
bility (the Pershing la's 900 KM range is too low to be
included in the INF category). [Ref. 149]
The GLCM is a variant of the Tomahawk missile adapted
for launch from mobile platforms. It is 219 inches long,
powered by a turbofan engine and guided by inertial navigation
which is updated by terrain matching at periodic intervals.
[Ref. 150] It can carry a 200 kiloton pay load in excess of
1600 nm. Its advantages are in mobility, ability to penetrate
air defenses and accuracy. Since it flys at subsonic speeds
it has a relatively long time of flight when compared with
the Pershing II and is thus of marginal utility against long-
range, time-sensitive targets.
Nuclear payloads can also be delivered in Europe by the
following NATO aircraft: F-lllB, F-4, F-104, and UK Vulcan
Bombers. Land and carrier based A-6 and A-7 aircraft are also
included here. [Ref. 151]
The United Kingdom has four nuclear powered submarines,
each carrying 16 three-warheaded Polaris missiles. These
are considered as strategic weapons by the British and their
warheads are controlled by the British government. France
has five SSBN's, each carrying 16 single-warheaded missiles.
In addition France has 18 silo-based missiles of sufficient
range to reach the Soviet Union. These nuclear weapons are
also controlled by the French government and not under NATO
command. [Ref. 152]
C. INF WEAPONS TOTALS
There are significant differences of opinion between the
two countries as to how many of what type of weapons platforms
each side has. Total estimates of delivery vehicles and
warheads are difficult to ascertain and publish at the
unclassified level of this thesis due to the poor quality of
the data available. The 1982-1983 issue of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies; The Military Balance sees
the Warsaw Pact as having a distinct advantage in Theater
Nuclear Weapons. By the Institute's figures:
....Without Poseidon/Trident being included on the NATO
side, the Warsaw Pact overall advantage is about 3.1:1;
with Poseidon/Trident that advantage falls to about
1.7:1. [Ref. 153]
On the other hand the Soviets have made the existence of
a "relative parity" of delivery vehicles on both sides a
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major negotiating position. Their 1981 figures include 243
SS-20's, 253 SS-4,5's, 18 SSN-5 ' s (submarine launched) and
461 aircraft for a total of 975 delivery vehicles. Soviet
negotiators in Geneva have claimed the following numbers of
weapons in the NATO arsenal: 237 F-lll's, 246 F-4's, 240
A-6's and A-7 f s and 26 3 British and French delivery vehicles
for a total of 986 [Ref. 154].
Utilizing these numbers the Soviet press agency TASS says
the deployment of an additional 5 72 warheads by NATO in the
modernization track would give NATO a 1.5:1 advantage in
delivery vehicles and 2:1 advantage in warheads. [Ref. 155]
So the Soviets say that NATO has a 2:1 advantage in warheads





APPENDIX B: ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL
This appendix contains President Reagan's Zero Option
proposal which was given in an address to the National Press
Club in Washington, D.C. on 18 November 1981. It is taken
from the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
,
November 22, 1981, pages 1273-1278. This speech is quoted
extensively in Chapter IV of the thesis. It is included as
an appendix for reference purposes.
ARMS REDUCTION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Officers, ladies and gentlemen of the National Press Club
and, as of a very short time ago, fellow members:
Back in April while in the hospital I had, as you can
readily understand, a lot of time for reflection. And one
day I decided to send a personal, handwritten letter to Soviet
President Leonid Brezhnev reminding him that we had met about
10 years ago in San Clemente, California, as he and President
Nixon were concluding a series of meetings that had brought
hope to all the world. Never had peace and good will seemed
closer at hand.
I'd like to read you a few paragraphs from that letter.
"Mr. President: When we met, I asked if you were aware that
the hopes and aspirations of millions of people throughout the
world were dependent on the decisions that would be reached
in those meetings. You took my hand in both of yours and
assured me that you were aware of that and that you were
dedicated with all your heart and soul and mind to fulfilling
those hopes and dreams."
I went on in my letter to say: "The people of the world
still share that hope. Indeed, the peoples of the world,
despite differences in racial and ethnic origin, have very
much in common. They want the dignity of having some control
over their individual lives, their destiny. They want to
work at the craft or trade of their own choosing and to be
fairly rewarded. They want to raise their families in peace
without harming anyone or suffering harm themselves. Govern-
ment exists for their convenience, not the other way around.
"If they are incapable, as some would have us believe, of
self-government, then where among them do we find any who are
capable of governing others?
Ill

"Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political
and economic philosophies, and governmental policies to keep
us from considering the very real, everyday problems of our
peoples? Will the average Soviet family be better off or
even aware that the Soviet Union has imposed a government of
its own choice on the people of Cuba because the Cuban
military dictate who shall govern the people of Angola?
"It is often implied that such things have been made
necessary because of territorial ambitions of the United
States; that we have imperialistic designs, and thus consti-
tute a threat to your own security and that of the newly
emerging nations. Not only is there no evidence to support
such a charge there is solid evidence that the United States,
when it could have dominated the world with no risk to
itself, made no effort whatsoever to do so.
"When World War II ended, the United States had the only
undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military might
was at its peak, and we alone had the ultimate weapon, the
nuclear weapon, with the unquestioned ability to deliver it
anywhere in the world. If we had sought world domination
then, who could have opposed us?
"But the United States followed a different course, one
unique in all the history of mankind. We used our power and
wealth to rebuild the war-ravished economies of the world,
including those of the nations who had been our enemies. May
I say, there is absolutely no substance to charges that the
United States is guilty of imperialism or attempts to impose
its will on other countries, by use of force."
I continued my letter by saying—or concluded my letter,
I should say— by saying, "Mr. President, should we not be
concerned with eliminating the obstacles which prevent our
people, those you and I represent, from achieving their most
cherished goals?"
Well, it's in the same spirit that I want to speak today
to this audience and the people of the world about America's
program for peace and the coming negotiations which begin
November 30th in Geneva, Switzerland. Specifically, I want to
present our program for preserving peace in Europe and our
wider program for arms control.
Twice in my lifetime, I have seen the peoples of Europe
plunged into the tragedy of war. Twice in my lifetime, Europe
has suffered destruction and military occupation in wars that
statesmen proved powerless to prevent, soldiers unable to
contain, -and ordinary citizens unable to escape. And twice
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in my lifetime, young Americans have bled their lives into
the soil of those battlefields not to enrich or enlarge our
domain, but to restore the peace and independence of our
friends and Allies.
All of us who lived through those troubled times share a
common resolve that they must never come again. And most of
us share a common appreciation of the Atlantic Alliance that
has made a peaceful, free, and prosperous Western Europe in
the post-war era possible.
But today, a new generation is emerging on both sides of
the Atlantic. Its members were not present at the creation
of the North Atlantic Alliance. Many of them don't fully
understand its roots in defending freedom and rebuilding a
war-torn continent. Some young people question why we need
weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, to deter war and to
assure peaceful development. They fear that the accumulation
of weapons itself may lead to conflagration. Some even
propose unilateral disarmament.
I understand their concerns. Their questions deserve to
be answered. But we have an obligation to answer their
questions on the basis of judgement and reason and experience.
Our policies have resulted in the longest European peace in
this century. Wouldn't rash departure from these policies,
as some now suggest, endanger that peace?
From its founding, the Atlantic Alliance has preserved
the peace through unity, deterrence, and dialog. First, we
and our Allies have stood united by the firm commitment that
an attack upon any one of us would be considered an attack
upon us all. Second, we and our Allies have deterred
aggression by maintaining forces strong enough to ensure that
any aggressor would lose more from an attack than he could
possible gain. And third, we and our Allies have engaged the
Soviets in a dialog about mutual restraint and arms limitations,
hoping to reduce the risk of war and the burden of armaments
and to lower the barriers that divide East from West.
These three elements of our policy have preserved the
peace in Europe for more than a third of a century. They can
preserve it for generations to come, so long as we pursue them
with sufficient will and vigor.
Today, I wish to reaffirm America's commitment to the
Atlantic Alliance and our resolve to sustain the peace. And
from my conversations with allied leaders, I know that they
also remain true to this tried and proven course.
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NATO's policy of peace is based on restraint and balance.
No NATO weapons, conventional or nuclear, will ever be used
in Europe except in response to attack, NATO's defense plans
have been responsible and restrained. The Allies remain
strong, united, and resolute. But the momentum of the
continuing Soviet military buildup threatens both the
conventional and the nuclear balance.
Consider the facts. Over the past decade, the United
States reduced the size of its Armed Forces and decreased its
military spending. The Soviets steadily increased the number
of men under arms. They now number more than double those of
the United States. Over the same period, the Soviets expanded
their real military spending by about one-third. The Soviet
Union increased its inventory of tanks to some 50,000, com-
pared to our 11,000. Historically a land power, they trans-
formed their navy from a coastal defense force to an open
ocean fleet, while the United States, a sea power with
trans-oceanic alliances, cut its fleet in half.
During a period when NATO deployed no new intermediate-
range nuclear missiles and actually withdrew 1,000 nuclear
warheads, the Soviet Union deployed more than 750 nuclear
warheads on the new SS-20 missiles alone.
Our response to this relentless buildup of Soviet military
power has been restrained but firm. We have made decisions
to strengthen all three legs of the strategic triad: sea-,
land-, and air-based. We have proposed a defense program in
the United States for the next 5 years which will remedy the
neglect of the past decade and restore the eroding balance on
which our security depends.
I would like to discuss more specifically the growing
threat to Western Europe which is posed by the continuing
deployment of certain Soviet intermediate-range nuclear
missiles. The Soviet Union has three different type such
missile systems: the SS-20, the SS-4, and the SS-5, all with
the range capable of reaching virtually all of Western Europe.
There are other Soviet weapon systems which also represent
a major threat.
Now, the only answer to these systems is a comparable
threat to Soviet threats, to Soviet targets, in other words,
a deterrent preventing the use of these Soviet weapons by the
counter- threat of a like response against their own territory.
At present, however, there is no equivalent deterrent to these
Soviet intermediate missiles. And the Soviets continue to
add one new SS-20 a week.
114

To counter this, the Allies agreed in 1979, as part of a
two- track decision, to deploy as a deterrent land-based cruise
missiles and Pershing II missiles capable of reaching targets
in the Soviet Union. These missiles are to be deployed in
several countries of Western Europe. This relatively limited
force in no way serves as a substitute for the much larger
strategic umbrella spread over our NATO allies. Rather, it
provides a vital link between conventional shorter-range
nuclear forces in Europe and intercontinental forces in the
United States.
Deployment of these systems will demonstrate to the Soviet
Union that this link cannot be broken. Deterring war depends
on the perceived ability of our forces to perform effectively.
The more effective our forces are, the less likely it is that
we'll have to use them. So, we and our allies are proceeding
to modernize NATO's nuclear forces of intermediate range to
meet increased Soviet deployments of nuclear systems
threatening Western Europe.
Let me turn now to our hopes for arms control negotiations.
There's a tendency to make this entire subject overly complex.
I want to be clear and concise. I told you of the letter I
wrote to President Brezhnev last April. Well, I've just sent
another message to the Soviet leadership. It's a simple
straightforward, yet historic message. The United States
proposes the mutual reduction of conventional intermediate-
range nuclear and strategic forces. Specifically, I have
proposed a four-point agenda to achieve this objective in my
letter to President Brezhnev.
The first and most important point concerns the Geneva
negotiations. As part of the 19 79 two-track decision, NATO
made a commitment to seek arms control negotiations with the
Soviet Union on intermediate range nuclear forces. The
United States has been preparing for these negotiations
through close consultation with our NATO partners.
We're now ready to set forth our proposal. I have in-
formed President Brezhnev that when our delegation travels to
the negotiations on intermediate range, land-based nuclear
missiles in Geneva on the 30th of this month, my representatives
will present the following proposal: The United States is
prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-
launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their
SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. This would be an historic
step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially
reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the
people of Europe. This like the first footstep on the Moon,
would be a giant step for mankind.
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Now, we intend to negotiate in good faith and go to
Geneva willing to listen to and consider the proposals of
our Soviet counterparts, but let me call to your attention
the background against which our proposal is made.
During the past 6 years while the United States deployed
no new intermediate-range missiles and withdrew 1,000 nuclear
warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750 warheads
on mobile, accurate ballistic missiles. They now have 1,100
warheads on the SS-20s, SS-4s and 5s. And the United States
has no comparable missiles. Indeed, the United States dis-
mantled the last such missile in Europe over 15 years ago.
As we look to the future of the negotiations, it's also
important to address certain Soviet claims, which left
unrefuted could become critical barriers to real progress in
arms control.
The Soviets assert that a balance of intermediate range
nuclear forces already exists. That assertion is wrong. By
any objective measure, as this chart indicates, the Soviet
Union has developed an increasingly overwhelming advantage.
They now enjoy a superiority on the order of six to one. The
red is the Soviet buildup; the blue is our own. That is 19 75,
and that is 1981.
Now, Soviet spokesmen have suggested that moving their
SS-20s behind the Ural Mountains will remove the threat to
Europe. Well, as this map demonstrates, the SS-20s, even if
deployed behind the Urals, will have a range that puts almost
all of Western Europe--the great cities—Rome, Athens, Paris,
London, Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, and so many more— all of
Scandinavia, all of the Middle East, all of northern Africa,
all within range of these missiles which, incidentally, are
mobile and can be moved on shorter notice. These little images
mark the present location which would give them a range clear
out into the Atlantic.
The second proposal that I've made to President Brezhnev
concerns strategic weapons. The United States proposes to
open negotiations on strategic arms as soon as possible next
year.
I have instructed Secretary Haig to discuss the timing of
such meetings with Soviet representatives. Substance, however,
is far more important than timing. As our proposal for the
Geneva talks this month illustrates, we can make proposals for




The United States has been preparing carefully for
resumption of strategic arms negotiations because we don't
want a repetition of past disappointments. We don't want
an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end
in dashed expectations.
Now, I have informed President Brezhnev that we will seek
to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which
would result in levels that are equal and verifiable. Our
approach to verification will be to emphasize openness and
creativity, rather than the secrecy and suspicion which have
undermined confidence in arms control in the past.
While we can hope to benefit from work done over the past
decade in strategic arms negotiations, let us agree to do
more than simply begin where these previous efforts left off.
We can and should attempt major qualitative and quantitative
progress. Only such progress can fulfill the hopes of our
own people and the rest of the world. And let us see how far
we can go in achieving truly substantial reductions in our
strategic arsenals.
To symbolize this fundamental change in direction, we will
call these negotiations START—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.
The third proposal I've made to the Soviet Union is that
we act to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional
forces in Europe. The defense needs of the Soviet Union hardly
call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany
today than were in the whole Allied invasion force that landed
in Normandy on D-Day. The Soviet Union could make no more
convincing contribution to peace in Europe, and in the world,
than by agreeing to reduce its conventional forces significantly
and constrain the potential for sudden aggression.
Finally, I have pointed out to President Brezhnev that to
maintain peace we must reduce the risks of surprise attack
and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or
miscalculation.
I am renewing our proposal for a conference to develop
effective measures that would reduce these dangers. At the
current Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, we're laying the foundation for a
Western-proposed conference on disarmament in Europe. This
conference would discuss new measures to enhance stability
and security in Europe. Agreement in this conference is
within reach. I urge the Soviet Union to join us and many
other nations who are ready to launch this important enterprise.
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All of these proposals are based on the same fair-minded
principles—substantial, militarily significant reduction in
forces, equal ceilings for similar types of forces, and
adequate provisions for verification.
My administration, our country, and I are committed to
achieving arms reductions agreements based on these principles.
Today I have outlined the kinds of bold, equitable proposals
which the world expects of us. But we cannot reduce arms
unilaterally. Success can only come if the Soviet Union will
share our commitment, if it will demonstrate that its often-
repeated professions of concern for peace will be matched by
positive action.
Preservation of peace in Europe and the pursuit of arms
reduction talks are of fundamental importance. But we must
also help to bring peace and security to regions not torn by
conflict, external intervention, and war.
The American concept of peace goes well beyond the absence
of war. We forsee a flowering of economic growth and
individual liberty in a world at peace.
At the economic summit conference in Cancun, I met with
the leaders of 21 nations and sketched out our approach to
global economic growth. We want to eliminate the barriers to
trade and investment which hinder these critical incentives
to growth, and we're working to develop new programs to help
the poorest nations achieve self-sustaining growth.
And terms like "peace" and "security", we have to say,
have little meaning for the oppressed and the destitute. They
also mean little to the individual whose state has stripped
him of human freedom and dignity. Wherever there is oppression,
we must strive for the peace and security of individuals as
well as states- We must recognize that progress and the
pursuit of liberty is a necessary complement to military
security. Nowhere has this fundamental truth been more
boldly and clearly stated than in the Helsinki Accords of
19 75. These accords have not yet been translated into living
reality.
Today I've announced an agenda that can help to achieve
peace, security, and freedom across the globe. In particular,
I have made an important offer to forego entirely deployment
of new American missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union is
prepared to respond on an equal footing.
There is no reason why people in any part of the world
should have to live in permanent fear of war or its spectre.
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I believe the time has come for all nations to act in a
responsible spirit that doesn't threaten other states. I
believe the time is right to move forward on arms control and
the resolution of critical regional disputes at the conference
table. Nothing will have a higher priority for me and for
the American people over the coming months and years.
Addressing the United Nations 20 years ago, another
American President described the goal that we still pursue
today. He said, "If we all can persevere, if we can look
beyond our shores and ambitions, then surely the age will
dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the
peace preserved.
"
He didn't live to see that goal achieved. I invite all





APPENDIX C; OFFICIAL SOVIET REACTION TO ZERO OPTION
This appendix contains the official Soviet reaction to
the Zero Option proposal as released by TASS on 11 February
19 82. It is taken from The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press , 10 March 19 82, p. 14. This reaction is quoted
extensively in Chapter IV and is included as an appendix for
reference purposes.
WILL THERE OR WON'T THERE BE A NEW ROUND IN THE ARMS RACE?
Invariably guided by the interests of consolidating peace
and lessening the danger that a war will break out, the Soviet
Union has consistently advocated and continues to advocate....
that agreement be reached on concrete and effective measures
aimed at the limitation and reduction of medium-range nuclear
arms in Europe or even at their complete elimination.
As a result of the Soviet side's persistent and principled
line, it has been possible to start talks with the US on this
question. . .
.
But the fact that talks have begun and are under way is
not all that is important— the main thing lies ahead. . .
.
The American side continues to beat about the bush con-
cerning the so-called "zero option," which US President R.
Reagan set forth in his speech of Nov. 18, 1981, and is the
basis of the American draft treaty whose submission to the
Geneva talks was announced with such pomp in Washington on
Feb. 4, 1982.
Soviet leaders have several times given a principled
evaluation of Washington's "zero option" as totally unrealistic,
as something that can in no way be called a serious proposal....
If the limitations to be established are to be really
equal, are not to infringe the legitimate security interests
of either side and are to correspond to the task of curbing
the nuclear arms race, it's necessary to consider and take
into account—on the part of both NATO and the Soviet Union
—
the entire complex of equally formidable medium-range nuclear




As far as the question of Britain and France is concerned,
the point is not whether they will participate in the talks
or sign an agreement, since they don't want to; however, it's
clear that their arms in the pertinent categories should be
regarded as a component of the balance on the NATO side. Yes,
as a component....
It's evident that Washington's true hope is, by advancing
proposals that are designed to be unacceptable to the other
side, to create a logjam at the talks, to block them, and
then to try to blame the Soviet Union for this.
It's hard to get rid of the impression that Washington
would like to use the Geneva talks to calm the public of the
West Europe countries, which is protesting the US * s dangerous
military plans, and then, by deliberately leading the talks
into an impasse, to try to justify the deployment in Western
Europe, beginning in 19 83, of almost 600 new American medium-
range missiles. It looks as if the propaganda show that goes
by the name of "zero option" was needed for just this purpose...
The Pentagon sees the deployment of medium-range missiles
on the European continent as one avenue leading to the
creation of a first-strike potential against the USSR, and
its calculation is that in this event a nuclear war would be
limited to Europe.
The fact that such calculations are groundless does not
make them less insidious or criminal. The fact that Washington,
with imperial arrogance, is disregarding the vital security
interests of the European peoples and is making Western Europe
a hostage of its aggressive policy cannot fail to arouse
legitimate indignation.
Does all this mean that the problem of limiting medium-
range nuclear arms in Europe is insoluable? No, it does not. .
.
As L.I. Brezhnev stated earlier and reaffirmed in his
recent conversation with representatives of the Socialist
International, the Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement
on a real "zero" solution—one that would mean not anyone's
unilateral disarmament but the total renunciation by both
sides of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at
targets in Europe, and, moreover, of both medium-range and
tactical nuclear weapons. If the NATO countries agree with
this solution, the real winner would be the cause of peace
in Europe and the world over.
If the West isn't ready for such a radical solution, the
Soviet Union proposes that agreement be reached on a major
—
by more than two thirds—stage-by-stage reduction by both
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sides of their medium-range nuclear weapons, while retaining,
at all stages of the reduction, a balance in the weapons of
NATO and the Soviet Union that are subject to limitation.
In an effort to provide the necessary impetus to the
Geneva talks, the USSR has submitted a proposal to concentrate
efforts on the elaboration, in a short time, of a joint
document that would determine the following parameters of a
future agreement:
— in accordance with the principle of equality and equal
security, the agreement should cover and take into account
all medium-range nuclear arms-i.e., those with a range of
1,000 kilometers or more that are deployed in Europe and in
the adjacent waters or are intended for use in Europe;
—with a view to reducing the level of the aforementioned
weapons as much as possible for both NATO and the Soviet Union,
the agreement should provide for a reduction in the present
number of such weapons (approximately 1,000 units on each
side) to 300 units on each side by the end of 1990, with the
establishment of an intermediate level of 600 units by the
end of 19 85;
— the two sides will have the right themselves to deter-
mine the composition of the arms subject to reduction and,
within the limits of the agreed-upon levels of reduction, to
carry out, at their discretion, the replacement and moderniz-
ation of arms, the framework of which will be determined later;
— the principal means of the reduction of medium-range
arms will be their dismantling, which does not exclude the
possibility of the withdrawal of a certain part of these arms
behind agreed-upon lines;
—provisions will be worked out to ensure adequate control
over the fulfillment of commitments under the projected
agreement;
—during the time talks are under way, the two sides will
refrain from activity relating to the deployment of new
medium-range nuclear arms in Europe. The two sides 1 medium-
range arms already deployed in this region will be frozen,
both quantitatively and qualitatively.
The earliest possible reaching of an accord on the
fundamental questions listed above would provide reliable
guidelines for further work on the preparation of an agreement
and would impart a purposeful and concrete nature to the talks.
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Desirous of facilitating the reaching of an accord, the
Soviet Union has stated that, if the other side agrees to
establish a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range
nuclear weapons while talks are under way, the Soviet side
would be prepared to reduce, as a gesture of goodwill, a
certain part of its medium-range arms in the European part of
the USSR on a unilateral basis-i.e., as a preliminary install-
ment on the lower level that would result from the talks.
Now it is up to the United States of America to answer
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